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COMMENT 
Crafted from Whole Cloth: Reverse Stash-
House Stings and the Sentencing Factor 
Manipulation Claim 
MOLLY F. SPAKOWSKI† 
INTRODUCTION 
Kenneth Flowers is currently serving a mandatory 
minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment stemming 
from a conviction of conspiracy to possess with intent to 
distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine.1 While the ten-
year prison sentence is very real, the five-kilograms of 
cocaine is not, and never was. Mr. Flowers was caught-up in 
one of the elaborate and overused “reverse stash-house 
sting”2 operations employed by the Bureau of Alcohol, 
 
† J.D., 2019, University at Buffalo School of Law; Executive Publications Editor, 
Buffalo Law Review. I would like to thank the members of the Buffalo Law 
Review, specifically Richard P. Brooks, for their invaluable editing; Professor 
Guyora Binder for his insightful revisions to an earlier version of this Comment; 
and my family and friends, especially Gabriela A. Tremont and Andrew B. 
Plewinski, for their continued faith in me. 
 1. United States v. Flowers, 712 F. App’x 492, 496 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 2. In a traditional sting, undercover agents pose as buyers. In a reverse 
sting, undercover agents act as sellers. A reverse stash-house sting is a “reverse” 
sting because like selling, the government is providing the opportunity to rob the 
stash-house. 
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Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”). His story goes 
like this. 
ATF Special Agent Richard Zayas has made a career out 
of conducting reverse stash-house sting operations, and 
unfortunately for Mr. Flowers, Agent Zayas decided to give 
his well-worn skillset a try in Cleveland.3 To begin, Agent 
Zayas directed a confidential informant to gather general 
information about the community and report back any 
interesting findings.4 In doing so, the informant approached 
an acquaintance named Kali Alexander.5 He and Mr. 
Alexander discussed illegal activity, including a possible 
firearms sale.6 But while the weapon sale never occurred, 
Mr. Alexander did agree to sell the informant heroin.7 
Agent Zayas accompanied the informant to the heroin 
sale.8 He posed as a disgruntled drug courier and during the 
exchange, Agent Zayas proposed to Mr. Alexander an idea to 
rob a cocaine stash-house he knew of.9 He said the house 
would have about eight to nine kilograms of cocaine stashed 
in it and was guarded by two men, at least one of whom was 
armed.10 The two discussed the potential robbery and the 
possibility of splitting the cocaine 50/50 between Agent 
Zayas and Mr. Alexander and anyone who Mr. Alexander 
chose to help him assist in the robbery.11 The plan progressed 
over the next two weeks and Mr. Alexander brought 
 
 3. Flowers, 712 F. App’x at 495. ATF reverse stash-house sting operations 
follow nearly identical routines and this case is no different. 
 4. See id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. Mr. Alexander sold the informant and/or Agent Zayas 6.5 grams of 
heroin for $900. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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Rasheam Nichols and Justin Maxwell to meet Agent Zayas.12 
The four men discussed the details of the plan and Agent 
Zayas offered to provide a car for their use on the day of the 
robbery.13 
On the day of the robbery, Mr. Alexander, Mr. Nichols, 
and Mr. Maxwell went to meet up with the informant and 
Agent Zayas.14 Accompanying them were Terrance Chappell 
and Mr. Flowers.15 Mr. Chappell and Mr. Flowers were 
armed.16 This was the first time Agent Zayas met Mr. 
Chappell and Mr. Flowers.17 The men discussed the robbery 
for a few minutes, going over the plan, resolving questions, 
and preparing.18 Agent Zayas told all the men what he had 
told Mr. Alexander before—that the stash-house contained 
about eight or nine kilograms of cocaine, was guarded by two 
men, and at least one of guards was armed.19 Geared up and 
ready to go, the informant took the wheel and began to drive 
to the stash-house.20 However, they did not go to the 
imagined stash-house, and instead, he drove them to a 
warehouse where they were all arrested.21 
On September 23, 2014, all five defendants, including 
Mr. Flowers, were charged with conspiracy to possess with 
intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and 
with using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a 
drug conspiracy.22 Mr. Flowers had no criminal record and 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 496. Some were charged with additional, varying federal crimes. 
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was employed at the time of the fictitious robbery.23 He was 
introduced into the scheme by his cousin24 and his eagerness 
to make a large sum of money quickly ensnared him in the 
ATF’s reverse stash-house sting. Not even the target of the 
operation, Mr. Flowers is now serving a mandatory 
minimum sentence for a crime he likely would never had 
thought to commit but for the government’s creation and 
attractive framing of it. 
Mr. Flowers’ story is one of many similar cases resulting 
from the government operation conducted by the ATF known 
as a reverse stash-house sting operation. The ATF’s reverse 
stash-house stings developed in the late 1980s to combat a 
rise in professional robbery crews targeting stash-houses.25 
The operations have grown extremely controversial in recent 
years because they “empower law enforcement to craft 
offenses out of whole cloth.”26 
The government, being the sole creator of the operation, 
wields a dangerously unfettered amount of power. In 
creating the robbery, it is the government that chooses the 
quantity of drug to be robbed, the type of drug to be robbed, 
and the obstacles a target must overcome during the robbery. 
These elements correlate exactly to the defendant’s sentence 
length. Therefore, the discretion the government has to 
manipulate these elements allows it full control over the 
amount of time the defendant spends in prison.27 
This dubious imbalance of power in the hands of the 
government spurred the creation of the court-created 
constitutional doctrine of sentencing factor manipulation. 
Sentencing manipulation is a violation of the Due Process 
Clause. “Sentencing factor manipulation occurs ‘where 
government agents have improperly enlarged the scope or 
 
 23. Id. at 496–97. 
 24. Id. at 497. 
 25. United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Flowers, 712 F. App’x at 509 (Stranch, J., dissenting). 
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scale of [a] crime.’”28 When a court determines the 
government has engaged in such manipulation, the court has 
the “power to impose a sentence below the statutory 
mandatory minimum as an equitable remedy.”29 
A claim of sentencing factor manipulation is raised by 
the defendant at the time of sentencing. Under the claim, the 
defendant argues the government, by and through its law 
enforcement officers, unduly influenced the factors relevant 
to determining sentence length, in a manner that exposed 
him to a longer and usually mandatory prison sentence. The 
sentencing factor manipulation doctrine is grounded in the 
doctrine of entrapment and the due process based doctrine of 
outrageous government conduct. It is highly applicable to 
cases of reverse stash-house stings. 
This Comment proposes adopting a modified sentencing 
factor manipulation claim that can be brought by defendants 
in reverse stash-house sting cases. Part I explains how a 
reverse stash-house sting is conducted and briefly examines 
why the reverse stash-house stings are becoming more and 
more disfavored in federal courts. Part II describes the 
historical and doctrinal underpinnings of the sentencing 
factor manipulation claim, including a close examination of 
the entrapment defense, the due process based outrageous 
government conduct claim, and the structure of sentencing 
in the federal courts. Part III examines the current state of 
the sentencing factor manipulation claim across the federal 
circuit courts. Finally, Part IV discusses why the sentencing 
factor manipulation claim is so relevant to reverse stash-
house sting cases, distinguishes other defenses and claims 
that are less applicable, and proposes a version of the 
sentencing factor manipulation claim to be adopted. 
 
 28. United States v. Rivera-Ruperto, 852 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2017) (alteration 
in original) (quoting United States v. Lucena-Rivera, 750 F.3d 43, 55 (1st Cir. 
2014)). 
 29. Id. (quoting United States v. Fontes, 415 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 2005)). 
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I. THE REVERSE STASH-HOUSE STING 
A. Explanation of the Operations 
Sting operations have been utilized by law enforcement 
officers for decades. Reverse sting operations started in the 
1980s with “reverse buys”—instead of posing as a buyer, an 
undercover law enforcement agent poses as a seller and the 
defendant violates the law when he buys whatever illegal 
product the undercover agent is selling.30 Reverse stash-
house stings follow reverse stings in that the government 
offers the illegal opportunity to the defendant. The ATF 
created reverse stash-house stings in Miami in the early 
1990s.31 Drug cartels moving large quantities of cocaine into 
South Florida attracted “freelance criminals” seeking to 
poach the shipments.32 This in turn resulted in shootouts and 
many innocent deaths.33 The ATF combatted the freelance 
criminals using the reverse stash-house sting.34 
Over 1,000 people have been prosecuted in nearly 
identical operations conducted by the ATF across the 
country.35 The protocol used in the operations is the same 
every time and proceeds as follows. A confidential informant 
working with the ATF selects a person (the target) he 
believes can be enticed into robbing a house used to store 
 
 30. Damon D. Camp, Out of the Quagmire After Jacobson v. United States: 
Towards a More Balanced Entrapment Standard, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1055, 1055–60 (1993). “Abscam and the pursuit of John DeLorean are perhaps 
the most notorious federal reverse sting operations.” Id. at 1058. 
 31. Brad Heath, ATF Uses Fake Drugs, Big Bucks to Snare Suspects, USA 
TODAY (June 28, 2013, 11:26 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news 
/nation/2013/06/27/atf-stash-houses-sting-usa-today-investigation/2457109/. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. The ATF now has reverse stash-house sting operations in nearly half 
the states. Id. 
 35. Id. 
2019] REVERSE STASH-HOUSE STINGS 457 
drugs awaiting distribution (stash-house).36 The informant 
identifies the target to an ATF agent.37 The undercover ATF 
agent then approaches the target and poses as a disgruntled 
drug courier.38 The agent tells the target he has knowledge 
about a stash-house containing a large quantity of cocaine 
and suggests they join forces to rob the house and spilt the 
proceeds.39 Sometimes the agent suggests armed men guard 
the house, sometimes the agent suggests the target recruit 
others to help in the robbery, sometimes the agent suggests 
he can supply the extra manpower, sometimes the agent 
suggests the use of firearms, and sometimes the agent 
suggests he will provide the transportation on the day of the 
robbery.40 
Once the target or targets have taken steps to rob the 
stash-house, they are all apprehended and charged with 
conspiracy to violate federal narcotics laws, as well as a 
variety of other federal crimes.41 The only problem is . . . the 
house, the drugs, and the guards with guns are all 
fictitious—the whole scheme nothing more than a fiction 
authored by the government. Because the reverse stash-
house sting operations are wholly the inventions of ATF 
agents, they have drawn criticism from not only the 
judiciary, but from news reporting and scholarly writings. 
B. Precarious Legal Position 
The ATF reverse stash-house sting operations have 
serious misgivings that have placed them in a precarious and 
near fatal legal position. On their face and in actuality, the 
operations do not achieve the government’s declared goal of 
 
 36. United States v. Pedrin, 797 F.3d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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making communities safer.42 Preexisting criminal 
enterprises are not targeted and no already existing drug 
rings or conspiracies are broken up as a result of the 
operations.43 Often times, targets have little to no criminal 
record and are not the type of serious or violent offender one 
would expect the government to be targeting.44 The crime 
proposed by the government is a “massive” one, and 
“somewhat baffling,” as the persons who the government 
targets do “not have ‘massive’ criminal histories to match.”45 
In some cases, the target is a reformed offender with a minor 
criminal history who has obtained gainful employment and 
worked to reestablish his place in society.46 His success is 
immediately destroyed when he cannot resist the half-a-
million-dollar payday touted by an undercover ATF agent 
and is subsequently placed back into the criminal justice 
system.47 
The operations are always scripted as a “big-hit”—a 
robbery of a stash-house containing an amount of drugs that 
will result in a lucrative and nearly irresistible payday.48 The 
ATF uses this powerful inducement without fail and the 
quantity of drugs imagined is always enough to qualify for 
mandatory minimum sentences.49 Furthermore, there just 
seems to be something inherently unfair with the fiction that 
is a reverse stash-house sting operation. The government is 
prosecuting a defendant “as if fantasy had been reality.”50 
Every element in the reverse stash-house sting is a falsity 
 
 42. United States v. Flowers, 712 F. App’x 492, 509 (6th Cir. 2017) (Stranch, 
J., concurring). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. United States v. McKenzie, 656 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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dreamed up by the government, from the nonexistent drugs 
to the nonexistent house, yet the “ironclad mandatory 
minimum” the defendant serves is in fact existent and very 
much a painstaking reality.51 
Moreover, the government “create[s] a criminal 
enterprise that would not have come into being but for the 
temptation of a big payday, a work of fiction spun out by 
government agents to persons vulnerable to such a ploy who 
would not otherwise have thought of doing such a robbery.”52 
Absent the government’s manufacture, the crime would not 
have existed. A former ATF supervisor has been quoted as 
saying, “Do you want police to solve crimes, or do you want 
them to go out and prevent crimes that haven’t occurred 
yet?”53 Arguably, most would answer government resources 
are not best used in the practice of inventing fake crimes. 
Lastly, the stings present a great danger of racial 
profiling. “People of color are allegedly swept up in the stings 
in disproportionate numbers.”54 While the ATF follows a 
protocol for reverse stash-house sting operations, the 
operations are “arbitrary and indiscriminate when it comes 
to the initial identification of suspects.”55 A confidential 
informant for the government selects individuals that seem 
likely to fall prey to an ATF sting.56 This lack of specificity 
has led several defendants to argue the operations are 
racially discriminatory and this controversy recently hit an 
 
 51. Id. at 211. 
 52. United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 303 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 53. Heath, supra note 31. 
 54. Washington, 869 F.3d at 197. 
 55. United States v. McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d 926, 934 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
 56. Id. Aside from racial profiling, the selection process presents a problem in 
relation to culpability. The ATF conducts a background investigation on the 
individual to determine if his criminal history makes him a good target. Id. 
However, the background investigation “does not necessarily reveal whether the 
subject has ever engaged in criminal activity of the magnitude contemplated by 
the sting.” Id. at 934–35. Just because an individual has dealt drugs or used 
firearms in the pursuit of crime does not mean he is inclined to deal drugs in the 
quantities proposed by the government. See id. at 935. 
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all-time high in Chicago.57 District judges joined together 
several reverse stash-house cases in order to hold an 
unprecedented joint hearing to hear testimony on issues of 
racial profiling in these operations.58 The court found that 
between 2006 and 2013, 78.7% percent of the defendants 
charged in the stash-house stings were black, 9.6% were 
Hispanic, and 11.7% were white.59 
The first judge to write as a result of the hearing was 
Chief Judge Castillo.60 While he found the operations to be 
plagued with racial overtones, he ultimately did not dismiss 
the charges against the defendants.61 He acknowledged the 
tension between law enforcement procedures and the 
country’s racially diverse community62 but stated in his 73-
page opinion that the defendants fell short of proving that 
the reverse stash-house stings unfairly targeted blacks and 
Hispanics.63 Chief Judge Castillo has also expressed his 
frustrations with the operations outside of his opinion. At a 
prior hearing, he told the government, “This isn’t about 
winning cases. It’s about doing justice. Some of these 
defendants have already served a lot of time. The 
government needs to think about that and needs to think 
about it very, very seriously.”64 
II. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORICAL AND DOCTRINAL 
UNDERPINNINGS OF THE SENTENCING FACTOR MANIPULATION 
 
 57. Jason Meisner, Federal Judge Finds ATF Drug Stash House Stings 
Distasteful but Not Racially Biased, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 13, 2018, 6:15 AM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-atf-drug-stash-
house-ruling-20180309-story.html. 
 58. Id. 
 59. United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976, 983 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
 60. Id.; Meisner, supra note 57. 
 61. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 986, 1022. 
 62. Id. at 985. 
 63. Id. at 986; Meisner, supra note 57. 
 64. Meisner, supra note 57. 
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CLAIM 
The sentencing factor manipulation claim is a court-
created doctrine rooted in the entrapment defense and the 
due process based claim of outrageous government conduct. 
The entrapment defense can be formulated either 
subjectively or objectively. The principles behind the 
objective formulation of the entrapment defense are the very 
principles that run rampant through the formulations of the 
sentencing factor manipulation claim. 
The objective formulation of the entrapment defense 
spurred another sort of quasi-objective formulation based 
upon due process principles. Arguably, this quasi-objective 
formulation morphed into the outrageous government 
conduct claim. Nevertheless, the outrageous government 
conduct defense is firmly rooted in due process principles on 
its own accord. The outrageous government conduct claim, in 
turn, spawned the sentencing factor manipulation claim, 
which is also firmly rooted in the same due process 
principles. 
The sentencing factor manipulation claim parallels both 
the objective formulation of the entrapment defense and the 
outrageous government conduct claim. The objective 
formulation of the entrapment defense, the outrageous 
government conduct claim, and the sentencing factor 
manipulation claim all focus on the actions of law 
enforcement officers. 
Furthermore, the advent of mandatory minimum 
sentencing laws and the creation of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines took sentencing discretion away from the 
judiciary. In an attempt to regain some power, courts began 
to consider defenses that allowed them circumspection at the 
time of sentencing—thus the sentencing factor manipulation 
claim started to gain applicability in the eyes of the courts. 
The entrapment defense, outrageous government conduct 
claim, and federal sentencing structure will each be 
discussed in turn. 
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A. The Entrapment Defense 
Entrapment is the defense that a “law enforcement 
officer used excessive temptation or urging to wrongfully 
induce the defendant[] to commit a crime [he] would not have 
ordinarily committed.”65 It exists entirely in case law at the 
federal level. Entrapment as a defense did not achieve 
general acceptance until well into the twentieth century and 
it was harshly rejected in the early New York case of Board 
of Commissioners v. Backus when the court used the now 
famous Biblical analogy to declare: 
Even if inducements to commit crime could be assumed to exist in 
this case, the allegation of the defendant would be but the repetition 
of the pleas as ancient as the world, and first interposed in Paradise: 
“The serpent beguiled me and I did eat.” That defence was overruled 
by the great Lawgiver, and whatever estimate we may form, or 
whatever judgment pass upon the character or conduct of the 
tempter, this plea has never since availed to shield crime or give 
indemnity to the culprit, and it is safe to say that under any code of 
civilized, not to say christian ethics, it never will.66 
Although initially rejected, the defense continued to 
arise in several influential nineteenth and early twentieth 
century cases and laid attacks on the propriety of 
governmental involvement in crime.67 It eventually gained 
traction when several state courts and lower federal courts 
began crediting entrapment as a defense. 
The defense was solidified when the Supreme Court first 
considered it in Sorrells v. United States and formally 
recognized entrapment as a defense.68 The Court held “when 
 
 65. THOMAS J. GARDNER & TERRY M. ANDERSON, CRIMINAL LAW 185 (13th ed. 
2018). 
 66. 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864). 
 67. See e.g., Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928); Woo Wai v. United 
States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915); People v. Mills, 70 N.E. 786 (N.Y. 1904). 
 68. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). In Sorrells, a government prohibition agent visited 
Sorells’ home. Id. at 439–40. Sorrells was a North Carolina factory worker who 
served in World War I. Id. The agent represented himself as a fellow veteran and 
during their visit, twice asked Sorrells to procure liquor for him, to which Sorrells 
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the criminal design originates, not with the accused, but is 
conceived in the mind of the government officers, and the 
accused is by persuasion . . . lured into the commission of a 
criminal act, the government is estopped by sound public 
policy from prosecution.”69 The majority, authored by Chief 
Justice Hughes, found entrapment as a defense was not 
merely that the crime was committed at the insistence of the 
government, but that the key factor to consider was “[t]he 
predisposition and criminal design of the defendant.”70 This 
has become known as the “subjective” test and is followed in 
all federal and most state courts.71 Under this formation, the 
focus is on the defendant’s predisposition—once the 
defendant has demonstrated improper government 
inducement, the government has the opportunity to show the 
defendant was predisposed to engage in the illegal conduct—
a lack of predisposition renders the entrapment defense valid 
for the defendant.72 
However, in his concurring opinion, Justice Roberts took 
strong issue with the majority’s construction, and instead 
proposed that the key factor in evaluating entrapment was 
the conduct of the law enforcement officers.73 He wrote, 
 
twice refused. Id. The agent asked a third time while reminiscing over war stories 
and this time Sorrells obtained a bottle of whiskey for $5. Id. He was then 
arrested for violating the National Prohibition Act. Id. at 438. The government 
called witnesses to show Sorrells had a reputation as a rumrunner, but there was 
no evidence Sorells had ever previously possessed or sold liquor. Id. at 441. 
 69. Id. at 445 (quoting Newman v. United States, 299 F. 128, 131 (4th Cir. 
1924)). 
 70. Id. at 451. 
 71. Fred Warren Bennett, From Sorrells to Jacobson: Reflections on Six 
Decades of Entrapment Law, and Related Defenses in Federal Court, 27 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 829, 834–35 (1992). 
 72. The Court explained the burden shifting nature of the entrapment in 
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372–73 (1958). The Sherman Court 
credited the Sorrells Court with having outlined the entrapment defense as when 
“the accused . . . examine[s] the conduct of the government . . . and [then] . . . the 
accused [is] subjected to an ‘appropriate and searching inquiry into his own 
conduct and predisposition.’” Id. (quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451); see also 
Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550–54 (1992). 
 73. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 456–59 (Roberts, J., concurring). 
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“[e]ntrapment is the conception and planning of an offense 
by an officer, and . . . its commission by one who would not 
have perpetrated it except for the trickery.”74 He relied on 
well-established public policy grounds to argue that courts 
should refuse their aid in schemes where “the actual creation 
of a crime [was] by those whose duty [it was] to deter its 
commission.”75 No weighing of equities between the guilty 
officer and the guilty defendant are necessary—where the 
government officer instigated the crime, the courts should be 
closed to prosecution.76 This has become known as the 
“objective”77 test and under this evaluation, the 
predisposition of the defendant is irrelevant—the focus is on 
the conduct of the law enforcement officers and whether the 
acts of the officers were likely to induce an ordinary citizen 
to commit the crime.78 
While Justice Roberts’ construction was not adopted, the 
disparity between the opinions has clouded the entrapment 
defense ever since. The dispute arose again nearly thirty-
years later in Sherman v. United States,79 where the Court 
considered entrapment for a second time. The case resulted 
in a five Justice majority opinion and a four Justice 
concurrence.80 Justice Warren penned the majority, and 
finding for the defendant, stated, “[t]o determine whether 
entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn 
between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for 
 
 74. Id. at 454. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 459. 
 77. The objective test can also be traced back to Justice Brandeis’ dissenting 
opinion in Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928). The Court refused to 
consider the entrapment defense. 
 78. Bennett, supra note 71 at 836–37. If the inducements offered by law 
enforcement were of the sort to which a normally law-abiding citizen would have 
responded, then the defendant who committed a crime in response to such 
inducements cannot be convicted. RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 791 (4th ed. 2016). 
 79. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). 
 80. Id. 
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the unwary criminal.”81 He declined to reassess Justice 
Roberts’ entrapment model proposed in his Sorrells 
concurrence,82 and instead relied on the facts to conclude 
there was no evidence that the defendant was predisposed to 
break the law.83 
The concurrence, written by Justice Frankfurter, again 
advocated for the objective test for entrapment and relied on 
Justice Roberts’ concurrence in Sorrells.84 He asserted 
entrapment should be located in the conduct of the officers 
and “the prevailing theory of the Sorrells case ought not to 
be deemed the last word” because it was the Court’s “first 
attempt at an explanation” of the entrapment defense.85 He 
made arguments based upon Congressional intent and public 
policy, asserting the courts should turn their backs to 
“enforcement of the law by lawless means.”86 However, his 
most notable point came when he foreshadowed what was 
soon to become a prominent due process claim against 
entrapment, when he said, “[t]he courts refuse to convict an 
entrapped defendant . . . because even if his guilt be 
admitted, the methods employed on behalf of the 
[g]overnment to bring about conviction cannot be 
countenanced.”87 This line inadvertently laid the 
groundwork for a due process based theory that would arise 
nearly two decades later. 
Entrapment did not come before the Court again until 
the 1970s, when the government came out on the winning 
side both times—in United States v. Russell88 and Hampton 
 
 81. Id. at 372. 
 82. Id. at 376. 
 83. Id. at 373–76. 
 84. Id. at 378–79 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 85. Id. at 379. 
 86. Id. at 379, 380. 
 87. Id. at 380. 
 88. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
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v. United States.89 Russell resulted in a 5–4 split with two 
separate dissents.90 Justice Douglas authored the first 
dissent and took adamant issue with the majority’s 
continued adoption of the subjective test for entrapment; he 
argued the defendant should be excused via the entrapment 
defense because regardless of the defendant’s “inclinations to 
criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the 
estimation of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him 
into further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced 
society.”91 Justice Douglas found the government to not only 
be the instigator of the crime but a partner in its commission 
and the “creative brain behind the illegal scheme.”92 
Justice Stewart wrote the second dissent in Russell and 
took similar adamant issue with the majority’s refusal to 
hold the government accountable for its contributory 
actions;93 he asserted, the government may not “create a 
crime and then punish the criminal, its creature.”94 More 
prominently though, he not only pointedly argued against 
the subjective test and advocated for the objective test, but 
also articulated each clearly and comparatively.95 In his 
opinion, the entrapment defense demands an approach that 
focuses on the conduct of the government rather than on the 
predispositions of the defendant.96 The predisposition of the 
defendant is a moot point when considering entrapment, as 
the defendant has conceded commission and therefore shown 
he was in fact predisposed to commit the crime in the sense 
 
 89. 425 U.S. 484 (1976). 
 90. 411 U.S. 423. 
 91. Id. at 437 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382–83 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 92. Id. at 439. 
 93. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. (quoting Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)). 
 95. Id. at 440–41. 
 96. Id. at 441. 
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that he was capable of its commission.97 He believed the 
objective test was better tailored to and more consistent with 
the purpose of the entrapment defense: to “prohibit unlawful 
governmental activity in instigating crime.”98 
While the majority, authored by Justice Rehnquist, stood 
by the subjective test, it did take the time to weigh the 
considerations of both tests.99 Russell urged the Court to 
adopt the objective test in his appeal and consider not his 
state of mind, but only the conduct of the government 
officers.100 Authentically, he relied on constitutional grounds 
to argue the officers were such vital participants in the 
criminal scheme and so overly involved in the ploy that 
criminally prosecuting him would violate the fundamental 
principles of due process.101 The Court found Russell’s 
argument did not fit the facts of his own case because the 
criminal scheme at issue could have been, and previously 
had been, carried out without the help of the government 
officers.102 Therefore, their aid and involvement stopped 
short of violating the fairness principles mandated by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.103 
But, the Court did not dispose of his argument in 
whole104: “we may some day be presented with a situation in 
which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous 
that due process principles would absolutely bar the 
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a 
conviction.”105 This line has reverberated throughout 
discussions regarding the entrapment defense ever since, but 
 
 97. Id. at 442. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 427–31 (majority opinion). 
 100. Id. at 430. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 431. 
 103. Id. at 432. 
 104. Id. at 431–32. 
 105. Id. 
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has also taken shape as a new and separate claim to be 
brought by a defendant at trial, which is discussed infra. 
The subjective versus objective test debate over the 
entrapment defense raged on in Hampton,106 but it was the 
last case that featured this conflict in the context of 
entrapment.107 The majority of the Court relied on the 
subjective test, finding Hampton was predisposed to selling 
drugs regardless of the supplier,108 and the dissent relied on 
the objective test, finding the government’s actions in 
outright supplying the illegal drugs was unacceptably 
beyond permissible limits.109 For the purposes of this 
Comment, Hampton is more relevantly discussed infra. 
The last and most recent consideration of the 
entrapment defense by the Supreme Court was in Jacobson 
v. United States110 and legal scholars have deemed it to be 
the resurrection of the entrapment defense.111 The Court 
found for the defendant, reaffirming the principle that 
“[w]hen the [g]overnment’s quest for convictions leads to the 
apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left 
to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the 
law, the courts should intervene.”112 The case received 
noteworthy amounts of press, and one reporter described the 
 
 106. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). 
 107. Paul Marcus, Presenting, Back from the [Almost] Dead, the Entrapment 
Defense, 47 FLA. L. REV. 205, 214 (1995). The debate was furious for a long time, 
but Justice Brennan, the last major proponent of the objective test conceded the 
point in the 1988 case of Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 66–67 (1988) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
 108. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488–91. The case resulted in a plurality—the 
majority of Justices (5–3) agreed the defendant was predisposed to commit the 
crime. Id. at 485 (plurality opinion). But, two Justices penned a concurrence in 
which they disagreed with the plurality on a separate point. Id. at 491 (Powell, 
J., concurring). The dissenting three Justices disagreed in full. Id. at 495 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. at 495–500 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 110. 503 U.S. 540 (1992). 
 111. Marcus, supra note 107, at 211. 
 112. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553–54. 
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government’s conduct as “an extreme misuse of . . . power in 
which an innocent person was led to commit a manufactured 
crime.”113 This idea of “manufactured” crime that surrounded 
the Jacobson case was the building block on which lower 
federal court judges relied when they began to confront the 
surge of ATF reverse stash-house sting operations in the 
early 2010s. 
B. The Outrageous Government Conduct Claim 
The Russell case and Justice Rehnquist’s “we may some 
day” language within it have been deemed the birth of the 
outrageous government conduct claim.114 The claim, 
grounded in due process principles and raised by the 
defendant, asserts that the officers’ conduct relating to the 
crime was so outrageous that it bars the government from 
invoking judicial process.115 The standard for a dismissal 
based on the actions of the law enforcement officers is very 
high and conduct is only considered outrageous when it 
violates “fundamental fairness” and “shock[s] . . . the 
universal sense of justice mandated by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”116 
The claim was first raised by a defendant in Hampton v. 
United States.117 The defendant argued the government’s 
role in supplying him with illegal drugs to sell fell within the 
 
 113. Linda Greenhouse, Justices, in Entrapment Case, Cast a Rare Vote 
Against Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 1992, https://www.nytimes.com/ 
1992/04/07/us/justices-in-entrapment-case-cast-a-rare-vote-against-
prosecutors.html. 
 114. Stephen A. Miller, Comment, The Case for Preserving the Outrageous 
Government Conduct Defense, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 305, 314 (1996) (“With this 
somewhat cryptic statement, the outrageous government conduct defense was 
born.”). 
 115. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1973). 
 116. Id. at 432 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also United States v. 
Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing outrageous conduct 
as “so excessive, flagrant, scandalous, intolerable and offensive”). 
 117. 425 U.S. 484, 488 (1976). 
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sort of “outrageous government conduct” Justice Rehnquist 
pondered in Russell.118 He argued this outrageous conduct 
constituted a violation of his due process rights.119 Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for three members of the Court, was not 
impressed. Justice Rehnquist opined the defendant 
misunderstood his commentary in Russell and attempted to 
destroy the very doctrine he created: “the police conduct here 
no more deprived defendant of any right secured to him by 
the United States Constitution than did the police conduct in 
Russell deprive Russell of any rights.”120 
However, Justice Rehnquist did not capture the majority 
of the court and two Justices joined in a concurrence that 
specifically disagreed with Justice Rehnquist’s viewpoint on 
the outrageous government conduct claim: “I am unwilling 
to conclude that an analysis . . . would never be appropriate 
under due process principles.”121 The three dissenting 
Justices shared similar feelings, claiming the officers’ actions 
transcended permissible limits in that “[t]he beginning and 
end of this crime . . . coincided exactly with the 
[g]overnment’s entry into and withdrawal from the criminal 
activity.”122 Thus, five Justices, a majority of the Court, 
recognized the viability of an outrageous government 
conduct claim based upon due process principles. 
Yet, this fractured holding created immense confusion, 
and the Court’s failure to revisit the claim since its 
articulation has permitted varying degrees of application of 
the claim in lower federal courts in the following years.123 
Some circuit courts have rejected the outrageous government 
conduct claim completely,124 some have accepted it but only 
 
 118. Id. at 489. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 490–91. 
 121. Id. at 493. 
 122. Id. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 123. See Miller, supra note 114, at 315. 
 124. See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1995); United States 
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used it in application once or twice,125 and some have 
recognized its viability but have yet to find a case where it 
applies because of their impossibly high standard for 
outrageousness.126 
Among the courts that recognize the claim but have 
declined to apply it thus far are the First, Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.127 Their 
standard for outrageousness bars application of the claim 
even when the defendant has accurately presented it.128 The 
First Circuit reserves the application of the claim for the 
most egregious and despicable situations, in which the 
government has been so overly involved in the crime so that 
it is as if the government has wholly created the criminal 
venture.129 The Second Circuit applies the claim only when 
the government’s conduct offends common notions of 
decency, and departing slightly from the First Circuit’s 
standard, it has said “coaching [the defendant] in how to 
commit the crime” does not qualify as outrageous conduct.130 
The Fourth Circuit takes a similar stance to that of the 
Second Circuit. The conduct of the government must shock 
or offend traditional notions of fairness in order to violate due 
process and the court has never held government conduct to 
violate this standard.131 
 
v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 125. See, e.g., United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 126. See, e.g., United States v. Hasan, 718 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2013); United 
States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Augustin, 661 
F.3d 1105 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Boone, 437 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Guzman, 282 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2002); see also United States v. 
Dyke, 718 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2013) (recognizing the doctrine but failing to have 
yet applied it). 
 127. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 129. See Guzman, 282 F.3d at 59; United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 5 (1st 
Cir. 1993). 
 130. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 121. 
 131. Hasan, 718 F.3d at 343. 
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The Fifth Circuit has stated the defendant bears an 
extremely high burden,132 the Eighth Circuit has held the 
government’s conduct must fall within a very “narrow band” 
of the “most intolerable” types of conduct,133 and the 
Eleventh Circuit has asserted the claim will only be applied 
in the most rare and outrageous cases.134 Interestingly, the 
D.C. Circuit has not “rule[d] out the possibility of finding 
valid a defense of outrageous government conduct,” but it 
limits the defense to government conduct “involving 
‘coercion, violence, or brutality to the person.’”135 The Tenth 
Circuit also recognizes the claim and has yet to apply it, but 
it has provided more guidance on the outrageousness 
standard.136 The defendant must show undue government 
involvement in the creation of the crime or considerable 
governmental coercion to induce the crime.137 The 
government cannot “engineer and direct the criminal 
enterprise from start to finish”138 and it cannot “generate[] 
new crime for the purpose of prosecuting it or induce[] a 
defendant to become involved for the first time in certain 
criminal activity.”139 
The two circuits that recognize the outrageous 
government conduct claim and have actually applied it, 
albeit only once or twice, are the Third and Ninth Circuits. 
They each have reversed a conviction, having deemed the 
government’s conduct so outrageous as to violate due process 
principles; these are the only two reported Court of Appeals 
 
 132. United States v. Gutierrez, 343 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 133. United States v. Boone, 437 F.3d 829, 841 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 134. United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1123 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 135. United States v. Caviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1533–34 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting 
United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1330 (1995)). 
 136. See, e.g., United States v. Dyke, 718 F.3d 1282, 1287–88 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 137. Id. at 1288; United States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3d 1515, 1521 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 138. United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 911 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting 
United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
 139. Id. at 911. 
2019] REVERSE STASH-HOUSE STINGS 473 
cases that have found a violation of due process on 
outrageous government conduct grounds.140 
In United States v. Twigg, the Third Circuit found “the 
nature and extent of police involvement in [the] crime was so 
overreaching as to bar prosecution of the defendants as a 
matter of due process of law.”141 In Twigg, the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) asked an informant to 
approach the defendant with the suggestion of building a 
methamphetamine laboratory.142 The DEA supplied all the 
necessary materials, including glassware, isolated farmland 
on which to build the laboratory, and a difficult to obtain, 
indispensable chemical ingredient.143 The defendant did not 
know how to produce methamphetamine and followed the 
instructions of the informant completely.144 The DEA was 
completely in charge and provided the technical expertise 
necessary for the operation.145 Furthermore, when a problem 
was encountered in the scheme, threatening its halt, the 
DEA readily found a solution.146 Based upon these facts, the 
court had “no trouble in concluding that the governmental 
involvement in the criminal activities . . . [had] reached a 
‘demonstrable level of outrageousness.’”147 
In Greene v. United States,148 the Ninth Circuit found the 
government’s conduct so outrageous as to have violated due 
 
 140. United States v. Combs, 827 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 2016) (“We are aware 
of only two reported court of appeals decisions—both from the 1970s—that have 
deemed the government’s conduct so outrageous as to violate due process.”); 
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F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 141. 588 F.2d at 377. 
 142. Id. at 375. 
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process.149 It reversed the defendants’ conviction on charges 
related to an illegal bootlegging operation.150 In Greene, an 
undercover government agent was intricately involved in the 
illegal bootlegging operation for over two years.151 He offered 
to supply, and did supply, necessary materials, an operator, 
a location for the still, and sugar at discounted prices.152 He 
also adamantly encouraged the revival of the operation, 
threatened the defendants to accelerate production, and was 
the sole purchaser of the illegal liquor produced.153 Based on 
the facts, the court held “the [g]overnment may [not] involve 
itself so directly and continuously over such a long period of 
time in the ‘creation’ and maintenance of criminal 
operations, and yet prosecute its collaborators.”154 It found 
the government’s conduct rose to a level “repugnant to [the] 
American criminal justice” system.155 
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit court that has 
identified a set of relevant factors to be used in assessing a 
claim of outrageous government conduct.156 United States v. 
Black is the seminal case for the claim because of the 
guidance the court provided for its evaluation. The court 
articulated a totality of the circumstances analysis, 
identifying the following six factors as relevant in 
determining if the government’s conduct was so outrageous 
 
 149. The defendants argued entrapment on appeal, not an outrageous 
government conduct claim. Id. at 786. The court did not find entrapment as a 
matter of law (under the subjective test) because the defendants were 
predisposed to manufacture and sell bootleg whiskey. Id. However, the court 
relied on the objective test for entrapment to hold the government’s conduct 
outrageous. See id. at 787. See also United States v. Combs, 827 F.3d 790, 795 
(8th Cir. 2016) (“The Ninth Circuit found a due process violation in Greene v. 
United States . . . .”). 
 150. Greene, 454 F.2d at 783–84. 
 151. Id. at 786. 
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 153. Id. at 787. 
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 156. United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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as to bar conviction: 
(1) known criminal characteristics of the defendants; (2) 
individualized suspicion of the defendants; (3) the government’s role 
in creating the crime of conviction; (4) the government’s 
encouragement of the defendants to commit the offense conduct; (5) 
the nature of the government’s participation in the offense conduct; 
and (6) the nature of the crime being pursued and necessity for the 
actions taken in light of the nature of the criminal enterprise at 
issue.157 
It also provided loose limits for what is and is not 
considered to be outrageous: it is outrageous for the 
government to engineer the criminal ploy from beginning to 
end, to use excessive mental or physical coercion, or to 
generate new crime for the sake of prosecution, but it is not 
outrageous for the government to infiltrate an existing 
criminal organization, to approach a known criminal with a 
criminal act, or to provide items necessary in the criminal 
scheme.158 
Black did not result in reversal of the defendant’s 
convictions but it did produce some of the most noteworthy 
comments on ATF reverse stash-house sting operations.159 
While Black attempted to provide some clarification 
regarding the outrageous government conduct claim, the 
confusion surrounding its viability and applicability 
continues on.160 The outrageous government conduct claim 
laid the foundation for the sentencing factor manipulation 
claim, and in many ways the latter parallels the former. Both 
claims maintain a primary focus on the actions of the law 
enforcement officers and both fall within the broader 
category of due process violations. But while the outrageous 
government conduct claim is an attack on the conviction 
itself, the sentencing factor manipulation claim is a more 
 
 157. Id. at 303. 
 158. Id. at 302. 
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 160. Several district courts have attempted to apply the outrageous 
government conduct claim. 
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narrow attack on the actual sentence.161 
C. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory 
Minimum Sentence Statutes 
The creation of mandatory minimum sentencing laws 
and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) 
inevitably begged for a defense or claim to counteract the 
increased discretion given to the government and taken 
away from the courts in charging and sentencing offenses. 
Congress enacted the Guidelines in 1987.162 By enacting the 
Guidelines, Congress intended to minimize judicial 
discretion in the sentencing process and eliminate 
disparities in sentences between similarly situated 
defendants.163 The Guidelines took away the courts’ 
previously wide discretion to determine the appropriate 
sentence in a defendant’s individual case.164 
Separate from the Guidelines, Congress has also 
legislated mandatory minimum sentences for specific 
crimes.165 Federal statutes are laced with mandatory 
minimum provisions. Mandatory minimum sentencing laws 
require a court to impose a specific sentence length for 
defendants convicted of certain federal crimes. A specific 
attribute of a crime triggers a minimum sentence statute—
for example, if a defendant possesses a machine gun in 
relation to a violent crime or drug-trafficking crime, a 
mandatory minimum sentence of thirty years is triggered 
 
 161. United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 162. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A2 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 1992). 
 163. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND 
POLICY STATEMENTS 8 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1987). 
 164. Eric P. Berlin, Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ Failure to 
Eliminate Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest, 
1993 WIS. L. REV. 187, 187 (1993). 
 165. Philip Oliss, Comment, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, The 
Safety Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1851 (1995). 
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because of the presence of the machine gun.166 If the 
defendant had possessed a handgun instead, he would only 
be facing a mandatory minimum sentence of five years.167 At 
sentencing, when a mandatory minimum length is in conflict 
with the calculated Guidelines sentence length, the 
mandatory minimum takes precedent over the Guidelines.168 
A judge is required to impose the mandatory minimum, but 
under United States v. Booker, is not required to impose a 
sentence within the Guidelines so long as he considers the 
wider range of sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a).169 
To calculate a sentence under the Guidelines, a judge 
examines the defendant’s relevant conduct to determine the 
offense base level, makes mitigating adjustments to the 
offense base level, and selects the defendant’s criminal 
history level.170 Where offense level and criminal history 
level intersect on the grid contained within the Guidelines, 
determines the defendant’s sentence length, or the range of 
months for which the defendant must be imprisoned.171 The 
defendant’s sentence is therefore, under the Guidelines, 
primarily determined by the amount of harm attributed to, 
or resulting from, the offense the defendant committed.172 
This harm-based penology, “results in a heavy focus on 
the amount or quantity of, for example, drugs sold, money 
 
 166. 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2018). 
 167. 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2018). In total, he would be facing ten years—
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stolen, money laundered, money embezzled, or taxes 
evaded.”173 Thus, punishments for drug and money offenses 
increase at a rate proportional to the amount or quantity of 
drugs or money involved in the offense.174 This quantity-
based approach takes the focus away from the defendant’s 
culpability.175 One of the major problems with the Guidelines 
is that defendants whose conduct caused the same harm are 
given similar sentences even though they may differ greatly 
in culpability.176 Defendants who committed the same crime 
are sentenced similarly, but defendants who are of 
comparable culpability are not sentenced similarly.177 
As stated above, under the Guidelines, a defendant’s 
sentence correlates with the harm their conduct created—
meaning the “quantity of drugs sold or bought [or] the 
amount of money stolen or laundered.”178 The Guidelines 
therefore allow law enforcement an opportunity to increase 
a defendant’s sentence length by manipulating factors in 
reverse stash-house sting operations that equate with the 
relevant conduct used to calculate sentence length.179 This is 
an unchecked increase in power in the hands of law 
enforcement.180 There is a large possibility and a great 
danger for this power to be used capriciously.181 The 
mandatory minimum sentencing laws also grant law 
enforcement an unchecked increase in power during sting 
operations. The decisions an officer makes during the reverse 
stash-house sting operation about the presence or absence of 
certain attributes of the crime can determine the defendant’s 
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mandatory minimum sentence. 
This potential for unfettered power in the hands of the 
Government has not gone unnoticed by the courts. Courts 
have attempted to check this power and restore some amount 
of judicial control over sentencing through the entrapment 
defense and the outrageous government conduct claim.182 
However, the application of these defenses are very 
limited.183 But, as frustration within the judiciary grew, 
courts began to surmise that even if the action of the 
government is “insufficiently oppressive to support an 
entrapment defense . . . or due process claim,” it still may 
warrant a reduction in the sentence of a defendant.184 From 
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III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE SENTENCING FACTOR 
MANIPULATION CLAIM IN FEDERAL COURT 
The term “sentencing factor manipulation” was first 
coined in United States v. Connell.185 In Connell, an 
undercover Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) agent 
approached Connell, a stockbroker, and requested he help 
launder money.186 Connell complied: he accepted cash, 
opened several bank accounts to spread the cash around, 
withdrew cash and redeposited it, and bought stock with the 
cash.187 The undercover agent told Connell the cash derived 
from the illegal drug trade but Connell was not overly 
inquisitive.188 On appeal, Connell argued the undercover 
agent “gratuitously spun a yarn about the illicit origin of the 
funds for the sole purpose of guaranteeing that [his] 
punishment would be increased.”189 He labeled this 
argument “sentencing entrapment” and requested a 
downward departure from the Guidelines range.190 
The court thought the term sentencing entrapment was 
catchy but that Connell’s argument was better labeled 
“sentencing manipulation.”191 Sentencing entrapment was 
 
 185. Id. at 192. “This appeal, in which the appellant complains that the 
government practiced ‘sentencing entrapment,’ calls upon us to venture onto 
terra incognita.” Id. 
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an inappropriate and misleading term because Connell 
admitted he was predisposed to structure cash transactions, 
thus there was no basis for an entrapment defense.192 The 
court proposed Connell’s argument was instead that “the 
government practiced what might more accurately be called 
‘sentencing factor manipulation.’”193 It acknowledged an 
element of manipulation is natural in any sting operation 
and defined the sentencing factor manipulation claim as “the 
manipulation inherent in a sting operation, even if 
insufficiently oppressive to support an entrapment defense, 
or due process claims, [that] must sometimes be filtered out 
of the sentencing calculus.”194 The court declined to “chart 
the line between permissible and impermissible conduct on 
the part of . . . government” but did say, “should a 
sufficiently egregious case appear, the sentencing court has 
ample power to . . . exclud[e] the tainted transaction from 
the computation of relevant conduct.”195 
Since Connell, the definition, use, application, and 
recognition of the sentencing entrapment defense and the 
sentencing factor manipulation claim have been massively 
chaotic. The federal courts are largely divergent in their 
treatment of the two claims. To say there is furious confusion 
over the definition and distinction of the claims would not do 
the current state of disarray justice. Therefore, the state of 
the claims will be discussed circuit by circuit. 
The First Circuit uses the terms sentencing entrapment 
and sentencing factor manipulation interchangeably.196 It 
recognizes both as one valid claim.197 The court has even 
gone so far as to describe sentencing factor manipulation as 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 196. 
 196. United States v. Kenney, 756 F.3d 36, 51 n.10 (1st Cir. 2014); United 
States v. Jaca-Nazario, 521 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 197. Jaca-Nazario, 521 F.3d at 57–58. 
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the “kissing cousin” of sentencing entrapment.198 It has 
defined the sentencing claim as when “law enforcement 
agents venture outside the scope of legitimate investigation 
and engage in extraordinary misconduct that improperly 
enlarges of the scope or scale of the crime”199 “in order ‘to 
secure a longer sentence than [it] would otherwise 
obtain.’”200 If a sentencing factor manipulation claim is 
brought successfully, the defendant is entitled to a sentence 
below the statutory minimum.201 The court has 
acknowledged the burden on the defendant is very high, as 
he must prove beyond a preponderance of the evidence that 
the government engaged in extraordinary misconduct.202 
While the inquiry focuses primarily on the behavior of the 
government, the defendant’s predisposition to commit the 
charged crime is also relevant as a secondary 
consideration.203 
In its most recent consideration of the sentencing factor 
manipulation claim in the context of an ATF reverse stash-
house sting, the First Circuit rejected the defendant’s 
argument of the claim.204 The defendant argued the 
government engaged in sentencing factor manipulation 
because the “ATF improperly expanded the scope of the 
planned robbery from $100,000 in cash . . . to $200,000 plus 
five kilograms of cocaine worth up to $100,000, thereby 
subjecting [the defendant] to a ten-year mandatory 
minimum sentence on the drug conspiracy count.”205 Even 
 
 198. United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 199. Jaca-Nazario, 521 F.3d at 58 (quoting United States v. Barbour, 393 F.3d 
82, 86 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
 200. Kenney, 756 F.3d at 51 (internal alterations) (quoting West v. United 
States, 631 F.3d 563, 570 (1st Cir. 2011)). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 52. 
 205. Id. at 49. 
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though the court admitted an explanation by the government 
as to why the changed terms of the robbery would have been 
preferable, it still rejected the defendant’s claim based on a 
vague finding of predisposition.206 
The Second Circuit defines sentencing entrapment and 
sentencing manipulation distinctly, but has not yet 
recognized the validity of either because it has not yet been 
presented with factual circumstances upon which a 
defendant would prevail on either claim.207 Sentencing 
entrapment is when the government has induced the 
defendant to commit a crime he was otherwise not 
predisposed to commit.208 It would “preclude a sentence 
where ‘outrageous official conduct’ has ‘overcome[] the 
[defendant’s] will.”209 Sentencing manipulation occurs “when 
the government engages in improper conduct that has the 
effect of increasing the defendant’s sentence.”210 It requires 
“a showing of ‘outrageous’ misconduct.”211 The court has 
applied the doctrines in theory but the claims have never 
been successful.212 
The Third Circuit’s approach is identical to that of the 
Second—it defines sentencing entrapment and sentencing 
manipulation distinctly, but has not yet adopted nor rejected 
the doctrines.213 Sentencing entrapment occurs where 
“official conduct leads an individual otherwise indisposed to 
dealing in a larger quantity or different type of controlled 
 
 206. Id. at 51–52. 
 207. United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 226 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 208. United States v. Gomez, 103 F.3d 249, 256 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 209. Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 226 (alterations in original) (quoting Gomez, 103 
F.3d at 256). 
 210. Gomez, 103 F.3d at 256 (quoting United States v. Okey, 47 F.3d 238, 240 
(7th Cir. 1995)). 
 211. Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 226. 
 212. Id. at 227; United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 148–49 (2d Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Bala, 236 F. 3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 2000); Gomez, 103 F.3d at 256. 
 213. United States v. Sed, 601 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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substance to do so, and the result is a higher sentence.”214 
Sentencing factor manipulation is a violation of the Due 
Process Clause that “occurs when the government unfairly 
exaggerates the defendant’s sentencing range by engaging in 
a longer-than-needed investigation and, thus, increasing the 
drug quantities for which the defendant is responsible.”215 
It appears216 the Fourth Circuit follows the Second and 
Third—it acknowledges the difference between the 
sentencing entrapment and sentencing factor manipulation 
claims217 but has declined to formally recognize either thus 
far, as it has not been presented with a set of facts requiring 
it to do so.218 The key element in its theoretical sentencing 
entrapment claim is the predisposition of the defendant and 
the key element in its theoretical sentencing manipulation 
 
 214. Id. at 230 (quoting United States v. Martin, 583 F.3d 1068, 1073 (8th Cir. 
2009). 
 215. Id. at 231 (quoting United States v. Torres, 563 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 
2009). 
 216. The court in United States v. Ramos, 462 F.3d 329, 335 (4th Cir. 2006) 
appears to intertwine the two claims, but the majority of the cases do in fact 
distinguish the claims; see supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text. 
 217. See United States v. Brown, 69 F. App’x 175, 177 (4th Cir. 2003). In 
Brown, Brown was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 
more than five kilograms of cocaine and more than fifty grams of cocaine base, 
which resulted in a 135 month imprisonment sentence. Id. at 176. Brown argued 
for downward departure on appeal based upon both, distinctively, sentencing 
entrapment and sentencing manipulation. Id. at 177. He argued the police 
engaged in sentencing entrapment because the officers demanded Brown sell 
them crack cocaine when he normally sold marijuana. Id. Separately he argued 
the police engaged in sentencing manipulation because they requested and two 
controlled buys instead of one. Id. The court rejected the sentencing entrapment 
claim because Brown “did not claim that he lacked a predisposition to committing 
the drug offense,” id., and it rejected the sentencing manipulation claim because 
“it is ‘not outrageous for the government to continue to purchase narcotics from 
willing sellers even after a level of narcotics relevant for sentencing purposes has 
been sold.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1155 (4th Cir. 
1994)). See also United States v. Herndon, 232 F.3d 891 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 218. See Herndon, 232 F.3d at 891 (“this court has declined to recognize claims 
of ‘sentence entrapment’ and ‘sentence manipulation’ in similar cases and 
declines to do so in this appeal”); United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145 (4th Cir. 
1994). 
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claim is the outrageous conduct of the government.219 
It is unclear if the Fifth Circuit uses the terms 
sentencing entrapment and sentencing factor manipulation 
interchangeably220 or if it acknowledges them as separate 
claims.221 Either way, it has never recognized the claim or 
claims as valid.222 Originally, the Fifth Circuit defined the 
claims separately. Sentencing factor manipulation was first 
defined in United States v. Tremelling,223 where the court 
mirrored the claim after a similar one in United States v. 
Richardson.224 
Richardson centered on a reverse-sting-money-
laundering operation.225 On appeal, the defendant argued 
the government, in violation of due process, brought more 
money to the table in order to increase his sentence: “the 
[g]overnment in its sole discretion could have put an 
additional $1 million, $2 million, or $3 million dollars in front 
of the gentlemen . . . which would effect the Guidelines.”226 
The court did not find the government unfairly manipulated 
the amount of money involved in the operation because the 
defendant repeatedly asked for larger sums to launder.227 
Relying on this case, the Tremelling court thus defined the 
sentencing factor manipulation claim as a due process claim 
focusing on the unfair, manipulative, or arbitrarily 
 
 219. See Brown, 69 F. App’x at 177. 
 220. See United States v. Rodriguez, 603 F. App’x 306, 321 (5th Cir. 2015); 
United States v. Macedo-Flores, 788 F.3d 181, 187 (5th Cir. 2015); United States 
v. Stephens, 717 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 221. United States v. Robertson, 297 F. App’x 316, 317 (5th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Tremelling, 43 F.3d 148, 150–51 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 222. Macedo-Flores, 788 F.3d at 187; Stephens, 717 F.3d at 446. 
 223. 43 F.3d at 150–51. 
 224. 925 F.2d 112, 117–18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1237 (1991). 
 225. Id. at 114–15. 
 226. Id. at 117, 118 n.17. 
 227. Id. at 118. 
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influential conduct of government officers.228 It 
distinguished sentencing claims related to entrapment from 
those sentencing claims related to Justice Rehnquist’s 
outrageous government conduct in Russell.229 
After Tremelling, the court’s treatment of the claims 
becomes blurred. Sometimes the court has treated the claims 
as separate theoretical claims: “[w]e have not yet determined 
whether sentencing entrapment, or the related concept of 
sentencing factor manipulation, is a cognizable defense to a 
sentence.”230 But other times, the court has combined the 
claims into one, labeled the quasi-claim sentencing 
entrapment, and combined the definitions into one: “[w]e 
have never recognized sentencing entrapment as a defense 
[but if we] were to accept it, it would only be cognizable in 
cases involving ‘true entrapment,’ or ‘overbearing and 
outrageous conduct’ on the part of the [g]overnment.”231 The 
combined theoretical claim focuses on both the 
predisposition or resistance of the defendant and the 
contributory or encouraging behavior of the government.232 
The Sixth Circuit defines sentencing entrapment and 
sentencing manipulation distinctly, but has not yet 
recognized the validity of either claim.233 The court defines 
 
 228. Tremelling, 43 F.3d at 151. 
 229. Id. at 152. 
 230. United States v. Robertson, 297 F. App’x 316, 317 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 231. United States v. Stephens, 717 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations 
omitted). 
 232. United States v. Macedo-Flores, 788 F.3d 181, 189 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(rejecting the defendant’s sentencing entrapment claim because he did not prove 
“the [g]overnment induced him to sell drugs generally” nor that “the 
[g]overnment induced him to sell larger quantities of drugs than what he was 
already predisposed to sell.”); Stephens, 717 F.3d at 447 (“[S]ince the 
[g]overnment’s conduct amounted to nothing more than passive encouragement, 
and since there is no evidence that [the defendant] resisted the increase in the 
targeted amount of money, we hold that [the defendant] would not be entitled to 
a sentencing entrapment defense even were it available in this circuit.”). 
 233. United States v. Flowers, 712 F. App’x 492, 504 (6th Cir. 2017); United 
States v. Hammadi, 737 F.3d 1043, 1048 (6th Cir. 2013). 
2019] REVERSE STASH-HOUSE STINGS 487 
sentencing entrapment as “similar to the subjective theory of 
entrapment and ‘focuses on the defendant’s lack of 
predisposition to commit the greater offense.’”234 It defines 
sentence factor manipulation as similar to “the objective 
theory of entrapment, and ‘focuses on the [g]overnment’s 
conduct.’”235 It does not recognize either claim because under 
the facts it has been presented thus far, it has not needed to 
decide whether to adopt or reject the doctrines.236 
The Seventh Circuit acknowledges that sentencing 
entrapment and sentencing factor manipulation are 
different claims.237 It accepts the sentencing entrapment 
claim but rejects the sentencing factor manipulation 
claim.238 The court explains sentencing entrapment as “when 
a defendant who lacks a predisposition to engage in more 
serious crimes nevertheless does so ‘as a result of 
unrelenting government persistence.’”239 It describes 
sentencing factor manipulation as “distinct from entrapment 
and occurs when the government ‘procures evidence 
“through outrageous conduct solely for the purpose of 
increasing the defendant’s sentence under the Sentencing 
Guidelines.’”240 While the court firmly rejects the sentencing 
factor manipulation claim, it does recognize that it “could be 
relevant to a district court’s application of the [18 U.S.C.] 
§ 3553(a) factors” at sentencing.241 But, the court finds its 
relevancy is lost when a defendant is sentenced to the 
mandatory minimum.242 
 
 234. Flowers, 712 F. App’x at 504 (quoting Hammadi, 737 F.3d at 1048). 
 235. Id. (quoting Hammadi, 737 F.3d at 1048). 
 236. Hammadi, 737 F.3d at 1048. 
 237. United States v. Blitch, 773 F.3d 837, 848 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. (quoting United States v. Knox, 573 F.3d 441, 451 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
 240. Id. (quoting Knox, 573 F.3d at 451). 
 241. Knox, 573 F.3d at 452. 
 242. Blitch, 773 F.3d at 848 (citing United States v. Wilson, 129 F.3d 949, 951 
(7th Cir. 1997)) (a district court may not use the doctrine of sentencing 
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The Eighth Circuit too considers sentencing entrapment 
and sentencing manipulation to be separate and distinct 
claims.243 Sentencing entrapment is where “an individual, 
‘predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is 
entrapped in[to] committing a greater offense subject to 
greater punishment.’”244 The locus of the inquiry when 
considering the claim is the defendant’s predisposition.245 
Conversely, sentencing manipulation “focuses on ‘whether 
the government stretched out the investigation merely to 
increase [the defendant’s sentence].’”246 It is the defendant’s 
burden to prove the government engaged in conduct solely to 
enhance the defendant’s sentence.247 Sentencing 
manipulation is a violation of the Due Process Clause.248 If 
the court makes a finding of sentencing manipulation, “it 
should grant a downward departure to the Guidelines range 
it believes would apply absent the manipulation, since such 
manipulation artificially inflates the offense level.”249 The 
court accepts both claims as valid defenses available to a 
defendant.250 
 
manipulation to impose a sentence below a statutory minimum). 
 243. United States v. Booker, 639 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 565 
U.S. 1043 (2011). 
 244. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607, 
613 (8th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Ruiz, 446 F.3d 762, 774–75 (8th Cir. 
2006) (“Sentencing entrapment occurs when official [government] conduct leads 
a defendant predisposed to deal only in small quantities of drugs to deal in larger 
quantities, leading to an increased sentence.”) (alterations in original) (quoting 
United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir. 2000)). 
 245. United States v. Martin, 583 F.3d 1068, 1073 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 246. Booker, 639 F.3d at 1118 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
Shephard, 4 F.3d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1993)); see also United States v. Torres, 563 
F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Sentencing manipulation occurs when the 
government unfairly exaggerates the defendant’s sentencing range by engaging 
in a longer-than-needed investigation and, thus, increasing the drug quantities 
for which the defendant is responsible.”). 
 247. United States v. Sacus, 784 F.3d 1214, 1220 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 248. Torres, 563 F.3d at 734. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
2019] REVERSE STASH-HOUSE STINGS 489 
The Ninth Circuit likewise distinguishes between the 
sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation 
claims.251 The former addresses the defendant’s 
predisposition and the latter addresses the conduct of law 
enforcement.252 Sentencing entrapment is found where “a 
defendant can show he was predisposed to commit a minor 
or lesser offense, but was entrapped [in committing] a 
greater offense, subject to greater punishment.”253 
Distinctly, sentencing manipulation results when “the 
government increases a defendant’s guideline sentence by 
conducting a lengthy investigation which increases the 
number of drug transactions and quantities for which the 
defendant is responsible.”254 They key difference between the 
claims is that for sentencing manipulation, “the judicial gaze 
should . . . focus primarily . . . on the government’s conduct 
and motives.”255 
The Ninth Circuit defines sentencing manipulation as a 
due process based claim.256 The defendant must show the 
government engaged in behavior solely to enhance his 
potential sentence.257 Relief is granted in only extreme cases 
involving outrageous government conduct.258 If sentencing 
manipulation is found, the court should grant the defendant 
a downward departure to the guidelines range because such 
manipulation artificially inflates the offense level.259 The 
Ninth Circuit recognizes both claims as valid but has yet to 
 
 251. United States v. Boykin, 785 F.3d 1352, 1360–61 (9th Cir. 2015) (The 
court acknowledged its “lack of precision with which [it had] previously used the 
terms ‘sentencing entrapment’ and ‘sentencing manipulation’” and clarified that 
they are distinct.). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 1360. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. (quoting United States v. Fontes 415 F.3d 174, 181–82 (1st Cir. 2005)). 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 1361. 
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find a set of facts where either apply.260 
The Tenth Circuit uses the terms sentencing entrapment 
and sentencing factor manipulation interchangeably.261 It 
recognizes both as one valid claim to be analyzed under the 
due process principle of outrageous government conduct.262 
The court is allowed to grant the defendant a downward 
departure if the government’s conduct is so shocking, 
intolerable, and outrageous that it has offended the 
universal sense of justice.263 Because the burden on the 
defendant is so high, the defendant’s claim of sentencing 
entrapment or sentencing factor manipulation “may also be 
considered as request for a variance from the applicable 
guideline range under the § 3553(a) factors.”264 
The Eleventh Circuit defines sentencing entrapment and 
sentencing manipulation as separate and distinct 
defenses.265 “While sentencing entrapment focuses on the 
defendant’s predisposition, sentencing factor manipulation 
focuses on the government’s conduct.”266 Sentencing 
entrapment occurs when a defendant, predisposed to commit 
a lesser crime, is entrapped into committing a greater crime 
and thus subjected to a greater punishment.267 The circuit 
has outright rejected sentencing entrapment as a viable 
 
 260. Id. at 1360–63. (The court applied the defendant’s sentencing 
manipulation claim but did not find the government’s conduct outrageous enough 
to meet the requirement for relief.). 
 261. United States v. Beltran, 571 F.3d 1013, 1017–18 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 262. Id. at 1018. 
 263. Id.; see also United States v. Martinez, 482 F. App’x 315, 317 (10th Cir. 
2012) (giving an example of the type of conduct that would meet the 
outrageousness standard and warrant a departure: “heavily pressuring the 
defendant during a sting operation to deal a higher volume of drugs than he 
otherwise would”). 
 264. Beltran, 571 F.3d at 1019. 
 265. United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410, 1414 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 266. Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
 267. Id. 
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defense.268 
However, it does recognize the validity of the sentencing 
factor manipulation claim.269 The circuit recognizes the due 
process based claim of outrageous government conduct and 
consequently, recognizes sentencing factor manipulation as 
a defense interrelated to the outrageous government conduct 
defense.270 Sentencing factor manipulation occurs when “the 
government’s manipulation of a sting operation, even if 
insufficient to support [an entrapment defense] or due 
process claim, requires that the manipulation be filtered out 
of the sentencing calculus.”271 The claim specifically involves 
“the opportunities that the sentencing guidelines pose for 
prosecutors to gerrymander the district court’s sentencing 
options and thus, defendant’s sentences.”272 If successful, a 
claim of outrageous government conduct would reverse a 
defendant’s conviction, while a successful claim of sentencing 
factor manipulation would simply reduce the sentence.273 
Finally, the D.C. Circuit recognizes both sentencing 
entrapment and sentencing manipulation and distinguishes 
between the two.274 Sentencing entrapment “occurs ‘if the 
government induces a defendant to commit a more serious 
crime when he was predisposed to commit a less serious 
offense.’”275 In slight contrast, sentencing manipulation 
 
 268. United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007); 
Sanchez, 138 F.3d at 1414. 
 269. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d at 1270. 
 270. Id.; Sanchez, 138 F.3d at 1413. The Eleventh Circuit recognizes the 
outrageous government conduct defense, which focuses on “the tactics employed 
by law enforcement officials to obtain a conviction for conduct beyond the 
defendant’s predisposition.” Sanchez, 138 F.3d at 1413. The inquiry “is whether 
the methods comport with the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process.” Id. 
 271. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d at 1270; see also Sanchez, 138 F.3d at 1414. 
 272. Sanchez, 138 F.3d at 1414 (quoting United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 
191, 194 (1st Cir. 1992)). 
 273. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d at 1270. 
 274. United States v. Mack, 841 F.3d 514, 523–24 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 275. Id. at 523 (quoting United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 
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“occurs ‘when the government unfairly exaggerates the 
defendant’s sentencing range by engaging in a longer-than-
needed investigation and, thus, increas[es] the drug 
quantities for which the defendant is responsible.’”276 The 
court illustrated the difference between the two claims in 
United States v. Hopkins.277 
Hopkins and his co-conspirators were ensnared in a 
reverse sting operation: an undercover law enforcement 
officer proposed Hopkins and his co-conspirators rob a liquor 
store.278 Undercover officers met several times with Hopkins 
to discuss the details of the planned robbery.279 At the final 
meeting, an undercover officer handed Hopkins and each of 
his co-conspirators a gun.280 Shortly thereafter, Hopkins and 
his co-conspirators were arrested.281 In affirming the district 
court’s order, the D.C. Circuit Court found the district court 
“clearly understood the difference between sentencing 
entrapment and sentencing manipulation.”282 Hopkins’ 
sentencing entrapment claim was correctly rejected as he 
“was perfectly comfortable with the idea of using weapons” 
and predisposed to commit the crime.283 
However, the district court properly credited Hopkins’ 
sentencing manipulation claim because the undercover 
agents brought and provided the weapons, weapons which 
the co-conspirators were likely incapable of supplying 
themselves.284 Thus the government’s conduct constituted 
 
1995)). 
 276. Id. (quoting United States v. Torres, 563 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2009)). 
 277. 715 F. App’x 20 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam), aff’g United States v. 
McKeever, 824 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 278. McKeever, 824 F.3d at 1116, aff’d sub nom. Hopkins, 715 F. App’x 20. 
 279. Id. at 1118. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Hopkins, 715 F. App’x at 21, aff’g McKeever, 824 F.3d 1113. 
 283. Id. at 22. 
 284. Id. 
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sentencing manipulation. If the district court had found 
sentencing entrapment, it would have been required to 
sentence Hopkins without the five-level Guidelines 
enhancement for possessing or brandishing a firearm during 
a robbery.285 Whereas because the district court had found 
sentencing manipulation, it correctly factored the 
manipulation out of the sentencing calculus and sentenced 
him as if his Guidelines range had been enhanced by three 
levels rather than five.286 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Courts have long recognized that law enforcement 
officers “must be given leeway to probe the depth and extent 
of a criminal enterprise, to determine whether co-
conspirators exist, and to trace the drug deeper into the 
distribution hierarchy.”287 Undercover operations and 
undercover agents serve an important purpose in the 
investigation of crime and “courts should go very slowly 
before staking out rules that will deter government agents 
from the proper performance of their investigative duties.”288 
However, this is neither the case nor the purpose of the 
continued law enforcement conduct and manipulation 
prevalent in reverse stash-house sting operations.289 A claim 
 
 285. Id. at 21. 
 286. Id. 
 287. United States v. Baber, 161 F.3d 531, 532 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting United 
States v. Calva, 979 F.2d 119, 123 (8th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Barth, 
990 F.2d 422, 424 (8th Cir.1993) (“[C]ourts should go very slowly before staking 
out rules that will deter government agents from the proper performance of their 
investigative duties.”) (quoting United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 196 (1st 
Cir. 1992)); Calva, 979 F.2d at 123. 
 288. Connell, 960 F.2d at 196; see also ALLEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 791. 
 289. Reverse stash-house stings are not instances of the government 
“combating crime too energetically.” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 
(1952). And the government is not excused by the legitimacy and public policy 
purposes underlying typical sting cases—”[d]isinterested zeal for the public good 
does not assure either wisdom or right it the methods it pursues.” Haley v. Ohio, 
332 U.S. 596, 605 (1948). After conducting an evaluation of cases, one court found 
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of sentencing factor manipulation would be especially 
applicable in these cases. 
A. Sentencing Factor Manipulation as it Relates to ATF 
Reverse Stash-House Sting Operations 
The structure of reverse stash-house sting operations is 
highly problematic.290 The freedom the government is 
allowed in charging offenses stemming from ATF reverse 
stash-house sting operations has created a “terrifying 
capacity for escalation of a defendant’s sentence.”291 Bluntly 
put, “sentencing discretion is delegated all the way down to 
the individual drug agent operating in the field.”292 “[A] stash 
house sting operation is the ‘perfect’ crime, at least from the 
standpoint of the prosecution, in that it predetermines both 
verdict and sentence.”293 This is because during a reverse 
stash-house sting operation, the ATF has the unbridled 
ability to choose the quantity of drugs, the type of drugs, and 
the obstacles the individual must overcome to obtain the 
drugs. 
Under the Guidelines, the sentence for a particular drug 
crime is tied to the drug quantity.294 The quantity of drugs 
supposedly reflects the defendant’s position in the drug 
hierarchy.295 However, in cases like these, where the 
government controls the quantity of drug, rather than the 
defendant, the predicted correlation between the quantity of 
 
a “constitutionally unacceptable” number of cases where the “crime [was] 
fabricated entirely by the police to secure the defendant’s conviction rather than 
to protect the public from the defendant’s continuing criminal behavior.” United 
States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 290. United States v. McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d 926, 935 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
 291. Barth, 990 F.2d at 424 (quoting United States v. Barth, 788 F. Supp. 1055, 
1057 (D. Minn. 1992)). 
 292. United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 293. McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 939. 
 294. Id. at 928. 
 295. Id. at 929. 
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drug and the defendant’s culpability is disrupted.296 The 
defendant may not have been entrapped in the traditional 
sense because he was willing to participate in the illegal 
activity proposed by the government, but that defendant also 
might have never had the capability, capacity, or inclination 
to deal drugs in the minimum-triggering quantity selected 
by the government.297 
The Sentencing Commission “is aware of the unfairness 
and arbitrariness of allowing drug enforcement agents to put 
unwarranted pressure on a defendant in order to increase his 
or her sentence without regard for his predisposition, his 
capacity to commit the crime on his own, and the extent of 
his culpability.”298 The Guidelines identify the danger 
inherent in the government’s ability to choose and then 
charge the quantity of drug.299 In limited circumstances, the 
Guidelines attempt to correct this danger by allowing judges 
to compensate for the government’s abuse of discretion.300 
Reverse stash-house sting operations give rise “to 
particularly dubious applications of the . . . Guidelines and 
mandatory minimum sentences.”301 The government sets the 
amount of drugs at a level that substantially increases 
sentencing exposure. “[S]entences should bear some rational 
relationship to culpability.”302 Often times, there is no 
 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1994); see also 
McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 929. 
 299. McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 929. 
 300. Id. For example, if the government sets a below-market price for an 
undercover illegal drug purchase and the defendant therefore purchases a large 
quantity of drugs in the set-up transaction, the judge can depart downward. Id. 
But, this “downward departure when the government artificially lowers the price 
of the drugs . . . only addresses one of the ways in which drug enforcement agents 
are able to manipulate sentences.” Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1107; see also McLean, 199 
F. Supp. 3d at 929. 
 301. United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 226 (3d Cir. 2017) (McKee, J., 
dissenting). 
 302. Id. 
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evidence to suggest the defendant would not have conspired 
to rob a stash-house containing some amount less than the 
five-kilogram mandatory trigger.303 If five-kilograms 
translates to a street value of approximately $200,000, who 
is to say that an impoverished defendant would not have 
agreed to rob the fictitious stash-house containing four-
kilograms of cocaine with a street value of $160,000?304 The 
government never answers this question and extremely few 
reverse stash-house sting operations have employed a 
fictional amount of cocaine less than the five-kilograms that 
triggers the mandatory minimum sentences.305 
Furthermore, the defendant is not always inclined to 
deal in the type of drug (cocaine) that the government 
suggests. Cocaine, the government’s drug of choice, is 
classified as a narcotic that requires harsher sentences. 
Cocaine lends itself to the reverse stash-house sting ploy. 
Quite simply, a large amount of cocaine can be stored in a 
house. Whereas in dealing with a large amount of another 
drug, for example marijuana, the house would not be a stash-
house, it would be a grow-house, or in the case of other drugs, 
some kind of production center. The government defends the 
quantity and type of drug chosen as necessary to protect its 
officers.306 It argues the operation needs to be realistic. Not 
only is this rationale incapable of any meaningful validation 
but it is troublesome because the tactical concerns of law 
enforcement should not be allowed to control the severity of 
charges or the sentencing range and the defendant has little 
to no opportunity to challenge the government’s reasoning.307 
In sum, the sentencing factor manipulation claim would 
be obviously applicable to reverse stash-house sting 
operations because of the very nature of the operations. The 
 
 303. Id. 
 304. See id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. United States v. McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d 926, 935 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
 307. Id. at 928–35. 
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ploy, scripted by the government alone, gives “the 
government [the] virtually unfettered ability to inflate the 
amount of drugs . . . thereby obtain[ing] a greater sentence 
for the defendant.”308 It is the government that chooses the 
quantity of drug to be robbed, the type of drug to be robbed, 
and the obstacles a target must overcome during the robbery. 
These elements correlate exactly to the defendant’s sentence 
length. Therefore, the discretion the government has to 
manipulate these elements allows it full control over the 
amount of time the defendants spend in prison.309 The 
sentencing factor manipulation claim would allow removal of 
these elements or factors chosen by the government from the 
sentencing calculus. 
B. Proposal 
The solution is simple. At trial, an entrapment defense 
is available to a defendant in a reverse stash-house sting 
case, but likely will be unsuccessful.310 Alternatively, where 
recognized, a defendant may bring an outrageous 
government conduct claim, but also will likely be 
unsuccessful. At sentencing, where recognized, a defendant 
may raise a sentencing entrapment defense or claim 
sentencing factor manipulation. Sentencing entrapment and 
sentencing factor manipulation are two separate and distinct 
claims—the former stems from the subjective theory of 
entrapment and the latter stems from the objective theory of 
entrapment. For cases involving reverse stash-house sting 
operations, sentencing entrapment is an inappropriate 
defense and will likely be unsuccessful. Therefore, the 
 
 308. United States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 309. United States v. Flowers, 712 F. App’x 492, 509 (6th Cir. 2017) (Stranch, 
J., dissenting). 
 310. Entrapment is usually unsuccessful in reverse stash-house sting cases 
because the defendant must show inducement and lack of predisposition. The 
defendant can rarely prove inducement because defendant’s are often eager to 
engage in the robbery plot due to the fictional high pay-off created by the 
government. 
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solution would be universal recognition of a sentencing factor 
manipulation claim. 
1. Entrapment and Sentencing Entrapment 
Distinguished 
A claim of sentencing entrapment is not appropriate in 
reverse stash-house sting cases and when evaluating a 
sentencing factor manipulation claim, it likewise is 
irrelevant whether or not the defendant raised or prevailed 
upon an entrapment defense at trial.311 
a. Entrapment 
Entrapment was adopted as a defense by the Supreme 
Court in Sorrells as a matter of statutory construction.312 The 
Court reasoned that in enacting the criminal prohibition at 
issue, Congress could not have intended “to permit law 
enforcement officers to instigate criminal acts by otherwise 
innocent people and then to punish them for such acts.”313 
Notably, entrapment, “rather than any constitutional 
prohibition, represents the principal legal restriction on the 
way in which undercover investigations are conducted.”314 
However, the federal courts employ the subjective test for 
entrapment—focusing on whether the defendant was 
predisposed to commit the crime at issue and affording a 
defense to a defendant who commits a crime pursuant to 
government inducement but who can show he was otherwise 
not predisposed in that direction.315 
 
 311. A defendant has every right to bring an entrapment defense in the case of 
a reverse stash-house sting, but the success of his entrapment defense will be of 
no consequence to his claim of sentencing factor manipulation. Even if he falls 
short of proving entrapment, he may still be successful on proving sentencing 
factor manipulation. See United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th 
Cir. 2007). 
 312. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 791. 
 313. Id.; see Sorells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932). 
 314. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 791. 
 315. Id. The defendant may demonstrate lack of predisposition in response to 
the government’s demonstration of predisposition. 
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In cases involving reverse stash-house stings,316 an 
entrapment defense is unlikely to be successful because the 
defendant cannot show sufficient inducement and lack of 
predisposition—even if he can prove one part, he cannot 
prove the other.317 Universally, entrapment is rarely, if ever, 
brought as a successful defense.318 As the Supreme Court 
explained when it first considered entrapment in Sorrells, 
entrapment occurs “when the criminal design originates with 
the officials of the government, and they implant in the mind 
of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged 
offense.”319 The line is between “an unwary innocent” and “an 
unwary criminal”320—an innocent with no predisposition 
versus a criminal predisposed. 
Illustrative is the case of United States v. McLean.321 In 
 
 316. I would argue entrapment has occurred in the vast majority of reverse 
stash-house sting operations. By authoring the fictional robbery plot from start 
to finish, I find that the “criminal design originate[d], not with the accused, but 
[was] conceived in the mind of the government officers,” Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 445; 
the “commission [was] by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the 
trickery,” id. at 454; “the actual creation of [the] crime [was] by those whose duty 
[it was] to deter its commission,” id.; and the government was not only the 
instigator of the crime but the sole responsible “creative brain behind the illegal 
scheme.” United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 439 (1973). Regarding 
predisposition, I do not believe a defendant with minor drug convictions is 
predisposed to commit a large scale stash-house robbery using weapons and I do 
not find that his eagerness for a large pay-day demonstrates such predisposition. 
 317. Reverse stash-house sting cases also present a unique obstacle regarding 
an entrapment defense: sometimes the defendant in the case was not the target 
of the ATF and therefore can’t use entrapment as a defense. United States v. 
Flowers, 712 F. App’x 492 (6th Cir. 2017) is an example of a case with a defendant 
facing this scenario. Mr. Flowers was not contacted by the ATF and not brought 
into the robbery plot by the ATF. Id. at 497. The target of the ATF’s plot, 
Alexander, recruited Mr. Flowers. Id. Thus, Mr. Flowers could not claim the ATF 
entrapped him. There are different strings of entrapment defenses available to 
these defendants, such as derivative entrapment, United States v. Conley, 875 
F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2017), and indirect entrapment, United States v. Valencia, 645 
F.2d 1158, 1168–72 (2d Cir. 1980), but those defenses are rarely successful. 
 318. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 791. 
 319. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442. 
 320. Russell, 411 U.S. at 429. 
 321. 702 F. App’x 81 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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McLean, a paid confidential informant for the ATF recruited 
Clifton McLean to participate in a reverse stash-house sting 
operation.322 After meeting several times with the informant, 
McLean met with the ATF agent (posing as a drug courier) 
who described the robbery: the stash house would contain “at 
least eight or nine bricks of cocaine” and there would be at 
least three armed guards inside the house.323 The agent 
described the layout of the fictional house and described how 
the drugs and money would be divided.324 McLean expressed 
his interest in the robbery and assembled a team.325 Five 
days before the planned robbery, McLean, his co-
conspirators, the ATF agent, and the informant met to plot 
the robbery in detail—McLean again expressed his interest 
in going through with the plan.326 On the day of the planned 
robbery, the group met at a junkyard where McLean and his 
co-conspirators were arrested.327 
At trial, McLean requested the jury be instructed on 
entrapment, however, the district court denied his request 
and the circuit court found no error.328 The Third Circuit 
stated “[e]ntrapment is a ‘relatively limited defense’”329 and 
“in order to obtain the instruction, the defendant must show 
that (1) he was induced by the Government to commit a crime 
which (2) he was not predisposed to commit.”330 Defined, 
“[i]nducement is more than ‘mere solicitation’ to partake in a 
crime” and predisposition is “the defendant’s inclination to 
 
 322. Id. at 82–83. 
 323. Id. at 83. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. at 83–84. 
 327. Id. at 84. 
 328. Id. at 84–85, 86. 
 329. Id. at 85 (quoting United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 179 (3d Cir. 
2007)). 
 330. Id. 
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engage in the crime for which he was charged.”331 The Third 
Circuit found McLean could not show either inducement or 
lack of predisposition.332 The evidence was insufficient to 
demonstrate inducement because “the Government merely 
offered McLean the criminal opportunity and . . . McLean 
willingly accepted.”333 He did not face “persuasion, 
fraudulent representation, threats, coercive tactics, 
harassment, [or] promises of reward or pleas based on need, 
sympathy, or friendship.”334 As to predisposition, the court 
found that even though McLean lacked any relevant criminal 
history, the fact that he was easily enticed by the ATF, 
showed enthusiasm for the plot, and never backed out 
evidenced his predisposition to the criminal conduct at 
issue.335 Thus, entrapment was not available to McLean as a 
defense.336 
McLean illustrates why an entrapment defense is rarely 
successful in reverse stash-house sting cases: if the 
defendant does not hesitate to join the plot, exhibits a 
receptiveness to the plot, does not indicate reluctance to 
engage in the plot, or exhibits a readiness to participate in 
the plot, predisposition has been shown and the defense is 
unavailable.337 Predisposition will always be the barrier to 
the entrapment defense in reverse stash-house sting cases 
because of the nature of the criminal activity proposed by the 
ATF—a large scale drug robbery results in a high pay-off, 
 
 331. Id. (quoting United States v. Wright, 921 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
 332. Id. at 86. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. at 85 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Fedroff, 874 
F.2d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 335. Id. at 86. 
 336. Id. But see United States v. Dennis, 826 F.3d 683, 690–94 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(finding the defendant’s criminal record demonstrated a predisposition to commit 
drug offenses but did not demonstrate a predisposition to commit robbery and 
firearm offenses). 
 337. See McLean, 702 F. App’x at 86; United States v. Wright, 921 F.2d 42, 46 
(3d Cir. 1990). 
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usually near $500,000, and this exorbitant pay-off draws an 
eagerness, readiness, and willingness to participate by the 
targets identified by the ATF who are of low socio-economic 
status.338 
b. Sentencing Entrapment 
Sentencing entrapment derives from the subjective 
theory of entrapment. A sentencing entrapment defense is 
successful where a defendant can show he was predisposed 
to commit a lesser offense, but was entrapped in committing 
a greater offense, subject to a greater sentence.339 It focuses 
on the defendant’s lack of predisposition to commit the 
“enlarged” crime created by the government.340 In the case of 
a reverse stash-house sting, the defendant must argue the 
government led him to deal in a larger quantity or different 
type of drug than he was otherwise predisposed to.341 
 
 338. Predisposition is a controversial component of entrapment and ill-defined. 
Predisposition is assumed to be based on something “real”—criminal record, 
character, state of mind, past acts, etc., but the facts of McLean show this 
assumption to be incorrect. McLean had no relevant criminal record, yet the court 
found him to be predisposed to the robbery because he was eager to engage. See 
McLean, 702 F. App’x at 86. I presume McLean was eager to engage because of 
the reward: the street value of nine bricks of cocaine. A high pay-off like this 
heavily blurs the line of predisposition: 
We assume that there are a few people who would not commit any 
criminal acts no matter what the . . . enticement . . . . Everyone else, we 
assume, has a price. That price may be quite high, for example because 
a person puts a high value on her good name, but it exists. If this 
assumption is true, then everyone except saints is predisposed to commit 
crimes. But, that in turn means that “predisposition” cannot usefully 
distinguish anyone from anyone else. 
Ronald J. Allen et al., Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 
413 (1999). 
 339. United States v. Boykin, 785 F.3d 1352, 1360 (9th Cir. 2015). Sentencing 
entrapment occurs when “a defendant who lacks a predisposition to engage in 
more serious crimes nevertheless does so” at the insistence of the government. 
United States v. Knox, 573 F.3d 441, 451 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States 
v. Veazey, 491 F.3d 700, 710 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
 340. See United States v. Flowers, 712 F. App’x 492, 504 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 341. See United States v. Sed, 601 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). Or where 
weapons are used, the defendant would have to show he was not predisposed to 
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The key distinction between entrapment and sentencing 
entrapment is that “traditional entrapment is an affirmative 
defense to the substantive crime, [whereas] sentencing 
entrapment is merely a defense to the sentence.”342 As such, 
unlike in the case of entrapment, where the defendant must 
show he was not predisposed to commit the criminal act, in 
the case of sentencing entrapment, the defendant must show 
he was not predisposed to commit such a degree of the 
criminal act.343 But, like with the entrapment defense, the 
key element in a sentencing entrapment defense is the 
predisposition of the defendant and the line remains between 
an “unwary innocent” and an “unwary criminal.”344 
Consequently, sentencing entrapment is just as unsuccessful 
as entrapment, and arguably more difficult to prove. 
In United States v. Black, the defendants sought a 
sentencing entrapment defense.345 The Ninth Circuit 
recognized the defense as viable, and defined sentencing 
entrapment to occur “when a defendant is predisposed to 
commit a lesser crime, but is entrapped by the government 
into committing a crime subject to more severe 
punishment.”346 The court clearly articulated that “[i]n the 
 
using weapons in the commission of offenses or was not predisposed to use that 
magnitude of weapon. 
 342. Jess D. Mekeel, Misnamed, Misapplied, and Misguided: Clarifying the 
State of Sentencing Entrapment and Proposing a New Conception of the Doctrine, 
14 WM. & MARY B. RTS. J. 1583, 1586 (2006). 
 343. Proving “degree” results in an evidentiary nightmare: 
Courts would be left to decide issues such as whether a defendant only meant to 
purchase five grams of cocaine for his own use as opposed to a trafficking amount 
of cocaine that he actually purchased. Courts would be forced to inquire into the 
quantities and types of drugs and the frequency in which defendants dealt in the 
past. 
Id. at 1607–08. 
 344. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 (1973). 
 345. 733 F.3d 294, 310 (9th Cir. 2013). In Black, the defendants were recruited 
by an ATF informant to carry out an armed robbery of a fictional cocaine stash 
house. Id. at 297–98. Criminal histories for three of the defendants showed no 
prior convictions for robbery or drug trafficking. Id. at 312. 
 346. Id. at 310 (quoting United States v. Mejia, 559 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 
504 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
context of a fictional drug stash house robbery, a defendant 
can show sentencing entrapment by demonstrating that he 
lacked predisposition—either through a lack of intent or a 
lack of capability—to conspire with others to take by force 
the amount of cocaine charged.”347 However, the court then 
demonstrated the problem with a sentencing entrapment 
claim in the context of reverse stash-house stings: “none of 
the defendants met his burden of proving lack of 
predisposition.”348 The defendants 
showed no reluctance about participating in the crime, the 
government did not induce the defendants’ participation in the 
fictitious robbery but simply presented the opportunity to them, and 
the defendants jumped at the opportunity to rob a stash house 
supposedly containing 23 or more kilograms of cocaine for purposes 
of making a profit.349 
Just as with entrapment, proving predisposition is a bar 
to bringing a sentencing entrapment defense in reverse 
stash-house sting cases. Furthermore, and unlike 
entrapment, a sentencing entrapment defense is wholly 
inappropriate because of the predisposition component. A 
sentencing entrapment defense is brought at sentencing—
the defendant asks the court to reduce the sentence because 
he was entrapped to commit a larger offense with a larger 
sentence than he was predisposed to. However, proving 
degree of predisposition further blurs the already blurred 
lines of predisposition by erasing the notion of “an innocent 
person.”350 Entrapment was meant to distinguish between 
the “innocent” and the “criminal,” but sentencing 
entrapment seems to try to distinguish between the “guilty 
criminal” and the “guiltier criminal.” 
At sentencing, the defendant has already admitted guilt, 
 
2009)). 
 347. Id. at 311. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. at 312. 
 350. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932). 
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and 
the analogy at sentencing to ordinary entrapment is not going to 
help a defendant who is arguing only about the number or size of 
the transactions[—h]aving crossed the reasonably bright line 
between guilt and innocence, such a defendant’s criminal 
inclination has already been established, and the extent of the crime 
is more likely to be a matter of opportunity than of scruple.”351 
Thus the focus on innocence is lost and the notion of 
predisposition is misplaced in sentencing entrapment 
defenses, making them an inappropriate defense in the 
context of reverse stash-house stings. 
2. Outrageous Government Conduct 
In circuits recognizing a claim of outrageous government 
conduct, the claim survives in theory but is highly 
circumscribed because the standard for outrageousness is so 
high.352 Unlike entrapment, which is rooted in statutory 
construction, the outrageous government conduct claim is 
rooted in due process principles.353 Theoretically, 
“governmental misconduct may be so outrageous that it 
requires dismissal of charges against a defendant under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”354 To violate 
due process, the “‘government’s conduct must be so 
outrageous as to shock the conscience of the court’ or be 
‘offensive to traditional notions of fundamental fairness.’”355 
The standard for outrageousness is extremely high. So high 
in fact that it is not practical to rely on the claim in order to 
combat the unfettered governmental power prevalent in 
 
 351. United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 352. See supra notes 123–59 and accompanying text. 
 353. “Outrageous government conduct occurs when the actions of law 
enforcement officers or informants are ‘so outrageous that due process principles 
would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain 
a conviction.’” Black, 733 F.3d at 302 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 
423, 431–32 (1973)). 
 354. United States v. Thorne, 661 F. App’x 791, 792 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 355. Id. (quoting United States v. Osborne, 935 F.2d 32, 36, 37 (4th Cir. 1991)). 
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reverse stash-house stings. Courts recognize the blatant 
misbehavior of the government, but because variations of the 
law enforcement tactics used in reverse stash-house stings 
have been recognized as reasonable in the past, they have 
difficulty finding the government’s misbehavior has met the 
outrageousness standard.356 
For example, in Black, the defendants argued an 
outrageous government conduct claim and while the court 
found “troubling aspects about [the] fictional sting and how 
it came about,”357 ultimately, “the government did not cross 
the line” of outrageousness.358 In the opinion of the court, 
circumstances nearing the line of outrageousness included: 
(1) the crimes of conviction “resulted from an operation 
created and staged by the ATF”;359 (2) the “evidence against 
the defendants consisted of words used at meetings” between 
the defendants, ATF agent, and informant;360 (3) the ATF 
agent “invented the scenario, including the need for 
weapons[, the need] for a crew, and the amount of cocaine 
involved”;361 (4) the defendants only overt actions were a 
response “to the government’s script”;362 (5) in recruiting the 
defendants, the ATF “was not infiltrating a suspected crew 
of home invasion robbers, or seducing persons known to have 
actually engaged in such criminal behavior,” it was rather 
“trolling for targets”;363 (6) the informant “provocatively cast 
his bait in places defined only by economic and social 
conditions;”364 and most notably (7) the government created 
“a criminal enterprise that would not have come into being 
 
 356. Black, 733 F.3d at 302. 
 357. Id. at 302. 
 358. Id. at 310. 
 359. Id. at 302–03. 
 360. Id. at 303. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. 
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but for the temptation of a big payday, a work of fiction spun 
out by government agents to persons vulnerable to such a 
ploy who would not otherwise have thought of doing such a 
robbery.”365 
Yet, the court’s concerns were “mitigated to a large 
degree”366 because: (1) the defendants told the ATF agent 
they had participated in criminal activity in the past;367 (2) 
the defendant bragged about committing prior criminal 
offenses using drugs or guns;368 (3) the defendants responded 
to the ploy with enthusiasm and were eager to commit the 
fictional stash-house robbery;369 (4) there was little evidence 
of coercion or pressure;370 and (5) the government did not 
provide any weapons, manpower, plans, or direction on how 
to perform the stash-house robbery.371 The court 
acknowledged the difficulty in discerning the line between 
law enforcement conduct that is acceptable and “that which 
goes a fraction too far”372 and found that the government’s 
conduct was not “so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to 
violate the universal sense of justice.”373 Thus Black 
demonstrates why defendants who bring outrageous 
government conduct claims are almost always unsuccessful. 
3. Sentencing Factor Manipulation 
Defendants in reverse stash-house sting cases are then 
left with the possibility of claiming sentencing factor 
 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. at 307. 
 367. Id. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. at 308. 
 371. Id. at 309. 
 372. Id. at 310 (quoting United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1438 (9th Cir. 
1986)). 
 373. Id. (quoting United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1209 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
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manipulation374—this is the most viable claim in reverse 
stash-house sting cases, however the current formulation of 
the claim requires modification in order to be a successful 
check on the unbridled power of the government. Sentencing 
factor manipulation should be defined as “when the 
government ‘improperly enlarge[s] the scope or scale of [a] 
crime’ to secure a longer sentence than [it] would otherwise 
obtain.”375 It is when “the government’s manipulation of a 
sting operation, even if insufficient to support [an 
entrapment defense or] a due process claim, requires that the 
manipulation be filtered out of the sentencing calculus.”376 It 
should be a type of due process claim that focuses on the 
conduct of the government and not the predisposition of the 
defendant.377 Under the modified claim, the conduct of the 
government offends due process when it arbitrarily 
interferes with the defendant’s liberty interests.378 If 
successfully brought, the conduct or manipulation of the 
government that arbitrarily inflated the defendant’s 
sentence should be filtered out of the sentencing calculus 
before mandatory minimums are applied.379 
As it stems from the objective theory of entrapment and 
 
 374. Other disciplines have proposed solutions to address the injustices 
inherent in reverse stash-house sting cases. For an example, see Sensenbrenner-
Scott SAFE Justice Reinvestment Act, H.R. 2944, 114th Cong., 1st Sess. (2015). 
 375. United States v. DePierre, 599 F.3d 25, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting 
United States v. Vasco, 564 F.3d 12, 24 (1st Cir. 2009)). 
 376. United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 377. Unlike in United States v. Kenny, 756 F.3d 36, 49–52 (1st Cir. 2014), 
predisposition should not be a secondary consideration that can deny relief to the 
defendant where the court has already found sentencing factor manipulation. 
 378. Due process based claims often create evaluation issues for law 
enforcement—how much is too much, how far is too far. But “under a rubric of 
sentencing [factor] manipulation . . . officers [can] know that every time they 
engage in certain prohibited investigatory conduct, their conduct will be found 
outrageous by a court and the sentence they attempted to manipulate will in fact 
be decreased by the court.” Mekeel, supra note 342, at 1616. 
 379. The defendant bears the initial burden of establishing sentencing factor 
manipulation. A judge’s determination is a highly factbound determination and 
subject to clear error review on appeal. 
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the outrageous government conduct claim, sentencing factor 
manipulation should be viewed as a type of due process 
claim.380 “The touchstone of due process is protection of the 
individual against [the] arbitrary action of 
government . . . .”381 The Supreme Court has opined that, 
The phrase [due process of law] formulates a concept less rigid and 
more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a matter of 
rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality 
of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a 
denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of 
justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other 
considerations, fall short of such denial.382 
The concept of substantive due process is fluid—it not 
only is intended to prevent governmental conduct that 
“shocks the conscience”383 but it also protects against 
governmental conduct that is “arbitrary.”384 It is a buffer 
against the abuse of government power.385 In its whole, due 
process preserves the “rights ‘implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.’”386 “To the extent that principles of Due 
Process are meant to be a check on government power, there 
is no more fundamental interest than liberty.”387 
In reverse stash-house sting operations, there is a 
“highly particularized and potentially dangerous form of 
 
 380. See generally United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1973); 
United States v. Sherman, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring); 
United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 381. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). 
 382. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) (quoting Betts 
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942)). 
 383. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952). 
 384. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992). 
 385. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 186 (1989). 
 386. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746(1987) (quoting Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. 
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)). 
 387. United States v. McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d 926, 943 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
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governmental power, law enforcement activity that defines 
both the contours of a crime and the punishment for that 
crime.”388 The manifestation of that power allows the 
government to not only create a test for a defendant389 but 
also create the penalties for failing that test in advance.390 
The penalty for failing the government’s test is a lengthy 
prison sentence. That lengthy prison sentence is a direct 
interference with one of defendant’s liberty interests: 
freedom. Therefore, due process is the appropriate basis to 
protect such an interest and the appropriate basis for 
sentencing factor manipulation claims.391 
Manipulation by the government is inherent in any sting 
operation, but reverse stash-house stings turn the typical 
sting on its head.392 The government alone has the ability to 
control the very factors that determine how long the 
defendant will spend in prison: “[d]rug agents can decide [the 
quantity of drug stored in the fictional stash-house, and] if 
the defendant bites at the bait, then that amount chosen by 
the drug agent will determine his drug sentence.”393 Not only 
can the government dictate the quantity of drug, but it can 
dictate other factors that determine sentence length, like the 
type of drug or the need for weapons. This custom design of 
both the crime and punishment in reverse stash-house sting 
operations constitutes an interference with substantial due 
 
 388. Id. at 942. The concentration of power that allows the government to 
define both crime and punishment does “more than offend some fastidious 
squeamishness or private sentimentalism,” it rises to an interference with due 
process. Rochin, 342 US at 172. 
 389. “[T]he Government seeks out its citizens for the purpose of testing their 
willingness to commit a criminal act.” McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 942. 
 390. Id. at 943. 
 391. The defendant is admitting his guilt but the government’s conduct has 
resulted in a lengthened prison sentence, thereby violating the defendant’s due 
process rights. 
 392. The danger of manipulation seems especially great where the defendant’s 
sentence depends in large part on the details of the crime chosen by the 
government, such as the quantity of drugs or presence of weapons. 
 393. United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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process, but often does not rise to the violation-level of due 
process required to dismiss charges or bar prosecution.394 
The manipulative conduct of the government in reverse 
stash-house stings often does not meet the outrageousness 
standard for a due process violation, but the conduct does 
still interfere with due process and thereby should warrant 
relief on behalf of the defendant. 
Sentencing factor manipulation should be argued as an 
interference with due process. While it’s historical origins 
can be traced to entrapment, the focus of the claim should be 
on the impropriety of government’s actions, not the 
predisposition of the defendant. The government’s conduct 
should constitute manipulation that interferes with due 
process warranting relief when it is found to arbitrarily 
implicate the defendant’s liberty interests by inflating 
sentence length.395 Sentencing factor manipulation occurs 
where the government engages in improper conduct that has 
the effect of increasing the defendant’s sentence, including, 
but not limited to, engaging in a longer than needed 
investigation, increasing the drug quantity for which the 
 
 394. Regarding the government’s custom design of both the crime and 
punishment, one court stated: 
The benefits of reverse sting operations . . . must be balanced against the 
danger of granting law enforcement officials unlimited power to define 
the scope of criminal culpability in a given case. The fact that a single 
officer in the field can determine the amount of drugs in a case, and, 
therefore, the length of sentence for a defendant, is a troubling scenario. 
Such awesome power cannot go unchecked. 
Commonwealth v. Petzold, 701 A.2d 1363, 1366 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). 
 395. The Black court articulated this point well: 
The agency creating the fictitious stash house can place any amount of 
imaginary drugs within it. The amount must, no doubt, be plausible; this 
limit aside, the ATF may make the object of the robbery as large as it 
chooses . . . . The ATF has free rein to . . . influence the number of 
defendants[,] . . . [and] invent[] armed guardians of the imaginary 
drugs . . . . [N]othing stops the government from filing additional 
charges and obtaining sentencing enhancements where the defendants, 
at the government’s insistence, are found carrying explosives, body 
armor, or machine guns. 
United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 317–18 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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defendant is responsible, or introducing the need for 
weapons. In evaluating a sentencing factor manipulation 
claim, a court should consider factors such as: 
the inherently arbitrary way in which stash house sting cases first 
ensnare suspects; the immense power delegated to case agents who 
can pre-ordain a sentence at the outset of the operation; the lack 
any meaningful way to test the validity of the Government’s 
justification for the amount of narcotics built into the sting; the lack 
of a genuine nexus between the amount of narcotics proposed and 
the defendant’s culpability; the lack of sufficient evidence . . . that 
[the defendant] ever sought to deal at the level proposed by the 
Government; the lack of a criminal record that unambiguously 
demonstrates [the defendant] had a propensity for violence, aside 
from his braggadocio; the risk that the sheer immensity of the 
sentences that follow from such operations compels guilty pleas; 
and the disparities in sentencing that are seemingly endemic to all 
of these prosecutions because the structure of the sting mandates 
lengthy imprisonment for any non-cooperator.396 
The standard of conduct required to prove the claim 
would be “arbitrary,” not the “outrageous” standard used for 
outrageous government conduct claims. The dilemma courts 
face in weighing their disdain for the behavior of the 
government in reverse stash-house sting operations against 
the high standard required for the outrageous government 
conduct claim would be alleviated. While courts have not 
found the government’s conduct in reverse stash-house sting 
operations to be outrageous, they have found it to be 
arbitrary.397 Arbitrary conduct is a more applicable standard 
because of the opportunities the Guidelines pose for law 
enforcement to gerrymander a defendant’s sentence.398 For 
example, in United States v. Fontes, the ATF agent testified 
he was “aware of the fact that there are guidelines that 
determine what a sentence is for a particular drug 
transaction, depending on what type of drug [is sold or 
purchased]” and when asked by the court if he was trying to 
 
 396. United States v. McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d 926, 943 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
 397. See United States v. Hudson, 3 F. Supp. 3d 772 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
 398. United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410, 1414 (11th Cir. 1998). 
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get a higher sentence for the defendant, the agent responded, 
yes, “[t]hat’s a part of it.”399 By recognizing a sentencing 
factor manipulation claim, courts would be expressly 
acknowledging that law enforcement officers are not allowed 
to structure reverse stash-house sting operations in such a 
way as to maximize the sentence imposed on a defendant. 
Government conduct would meet the standard for the 
claim when it arbitrarily inflates a defendant’s sentence. The 
standard should be lessened because a sentencing 
manipulation claim derived from the outrageous government 
conduct claim should parallel the same substantive and 
procedural bounds as a sentencing entrapment defense 
derived from an entrapment defense. Comparing 
entrapment to sentencing entrapment, the substantive 
standard is lower for the derived defense of sentencing 
entrapment: a defendant must show he was not predisposed 
to commit the criminal act (entrapment) versus a defendant 
must show he was not predisposed to commit such a degree 
of the criminal act (sentencing entrapment)—lack of 
predisposition versus lack of some degree of predisposition. 
Similarly, the substantive standard should be lower for the 
derived claim of sentencing factor manipulation. On an 
outrageous government conduct claim, a defendant must 
show the government’s conduct was so outrageous as to 
shock the conscience. Current law requires a defendant to 
prove the same level of outrageousness on a sentencing factor 
manipulation claim. This should not be the case. A defendant 
bringing a sentencing factor manipulation claim should be 
required to some lesser level of inappropriate government 
conduct. Thus the claim and derived claim would come into 
focus with entrapment and its derived defense—
outrageousness and some degree less than outrageousness. 
The lesser degree of a substantive standard is logical 
based on procedure. An entrapment defense is brought at 
trial and is a basis upon which prosecution may be barred, 
 
 399. United States v. Fontes, 415 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir 2005). 
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whereas sentencing entrapment is brought at sentencing 
and is not a basis upon which prosecution may be barred, it 
merely is a tool to reduce the sentence length. Likewise, an 
outrageous government conduct claim is brought at trial and 
is a basis upon which prosecution may be barred, whereas 
sentencing manipulation is brought at sentencing and is not 
a basis upon which prosecution may be barred, it merely is a 
tool to reduce the sentence length. The consequences are less 
severe for the success of a derived defense or claim and so 
there is less risk in having a slightly lessened standard.400 
As relief for a successful claim, the district court should 
filter out the government’s improper conduct from the 
sentencing calculus. While a district court cannot disregard 
a mandatory minimum,401 theoretically, an adjustment 
based upon a sentencing factor manipulation claim is not a 
downward departure.402 The district court will have filtered 
the manipulative conduct out of the sentencing calculus 
before a sentencing provision is applied—therefore, a 
mandatory minimum would not have arisen to begin with.403 
If a court finds a government action to be so objectionable 
that it amounts to sentencing factor manipulation, the court 
would simply remove that action and the mandatory 
minimum it would trigger (from the sentencing calculus) 
 
 400. The court in Black demonstrated this point: “[d]ismissing an indictment 
for outrageous government conduct [is such a severe consequence that it] is 
‘limited to extreme cases’ in which the defendant can demonstrate that the 
government’s conduct ‘violates fundamental fairness’ and is ‘so grossly shocking 
and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense of justice.’” 733 F.3d at 302 
(quoting United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1209 (9th Cir. 2011). “This is 
an ‘extremely high standard.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 
F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 401. Congress has only authorized a district court to depart downward from 
the statutory mandatory minimum in two limited circumstances: where the 
government files “a motion to recognize the defendant’s ‘substantial assistance,’” 
or where the defendant falls within “the provisions of the ‘safety valve’ embodied 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).” United States v. Simpson, 228 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 
2000). 
 402. United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 403. Id. at 1270. 
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before the sentence is computed.404 However, in the case 
where a minimum applies, success on the claim need “not be 
limited to a request for a discretionary departure, . . . it 
[should] appl[y] to statutory mandatory minimums as well 
as to guideline ranges.”405 Recognizing a sentencing factor 
manipulation claim would give greater discretion to the 
sentencing courts—reminiscent of the pre-Booker days 
where the Guidelines allowed courts to depart from the 
Guidelines sentence where “the court [found] ‘that there 
exist[ed] an aggravating or mitigating circumstance . . . that 
should result in a sentence different from th[e one 
described].’”406 
Parts of this proposed claim have been successfully 
applied in United States v. McLean.407 In McLean, McLean 
was caught-up in a reverse stash-house sting operation and 
faced a sentence of thirty-five years to life in prison with a 
mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years.408 At 
sentencing, McLean argued the government improperly 
inflated his sentence by choosing a quantity of drug (five-
kilograms of cocaine) that triggered a high mandatory 
 
 404. See id. at 1270 (giving an example: “[t]herefore, if the court found that 
inserting the silencer in the gun was so objectionable that it amounted to 
sentencing factor manipulation, that mandatory minimum would not apply 
because the silencer would be taken out of the sentencing calculation.”). 
Arguably, a finding of sentencing factor manipulation would authorize a court to 
depart not only from the Guidelines sentencing range but also from the 
mandatory minimum. United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 405. Montoya, 62 F.3d at 4. 
 406. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C4.1 introductory cmt. (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). The Guidelines 
specifically allow for departure in reverse sting operations if “the court finds that 
the government agent set a price for the controlled substances that was 
substantially below the market value . . . thereby leading to the defendant’s 
purchase of a significantly greater quantity of the controlled substance”—a 
quantity that would have been outside his means but became available because 
of the reduced price. Id. at § 2D1.1 cmt. n.27(A). 
 407. United States v. McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d 926 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
 408. Id. at 928. 
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minimum, and therefore his sentence should be reduced.409 
McLean was convicted, but the court found that imposing a 
sentence prescribed for the five-kilograms of cocaine would 
have violated McLean’s constitutional right to due process of 
law and therefore instead imposed a sentence that excluded 
consideration of the five-kilograms of cocaine and the 
corresponding mandatory minimum.410 
CONCLUSION 
Echoing down the hallways of federal courthouses are 
the numerous warnings given by the federal judges presiding 
over the ATF’s reverse stash-house sting cases, and they 
have not hesitated in expressing their disdain for the 
operations:411 the stings appear “highly susceptible to 
abuse;”412 be “wary of [stash-house] operations;”413 the stings 
are “a disreputable tactic;”414 “[z]ero[,] [t]hat’s the amount of 
drugs that the Government has taken off the streets as the 
result of . . . the hundreds of . . . fake stash-house cases;”415 
“[t]he time has come to remind the Executive Branch that 
the Constitution charges it with law enforcement—not crime 
creation;”416 “into temptation the Government has gone, 
ensnaring chronically unemployed individuals from poverty-
ridden areas in its fake drug stash-house robberies;”417 the 
Government “fire[s] [up] the imaginations of dreamers [with] 
 
 409. Id. 
 410. Id. 
 411. See United States v. Conley, 875 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2017) for a collection 
of cases criticizing reverse stash-house stings. 
 412. United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 103–04 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. 
Ct. 224, and reh’g denied, 137 S. Ct. 460 (2016). 
 413. United States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 414. United States v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401, 414 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., 
dissenting), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Jan. 16, 2013), on reh’g en 
banc sub nom. United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 415. United States v. Hudson, 3 F. Supp. 3d 772, 775 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
 416. Id. at 788. 
 417. Id. at 775. 
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easy wealth” and in turn becomes “the oppressor of its 
people;”418 “[i]t is time for these false stash house cases to end 
and be relegated to the dark corridors of our past;”419 “our 
criminal justice system should not tolerate false stash house 
cases in 2018.”420 
The government should take heed of these advisements, 
but in its failure to do so, federal courts should adopt a 
sentencing factor manipulation claim applicable in reverse 
stash-house sting cases. The claim would mitigate the fact 
that the fictitious drugs, fictitious houses, fictitious players, 
and fictitious robberies result in very non-fictitious sentences 
for the targets of the operations. It would also protect the 
fundamental liberty interest so threatened in these 
operations. As James Madison penned, 
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls 
on government would be necessary. In framing a government which 
is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in 
this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; 
and in the next place oblige it to control itself.421 
The only way to control the government in the cases of 
reverse-stash house sting operations is to effectuate a 
sentencing factor manipulation claim. 
 
 418. United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 318 (9th Cir. 2013) (Noonan, J., 
dissenting). 
 419. United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976, 983–84 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
 420. Id. at 984. Many state courts strongly disfavor the type of sting as well: 
“[t]he justice system should look with a jaundiced eye upon reverse sting 
operations[, t]his effectively is the justice system becoming involved in 
committing crime and not stopping it.” Leech v. State, 66 P.3d 987, 991 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 2003) (Johnson, P.J., concurring). 
 421. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher 
Wright ed., 1961). 
